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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  Preface 
This article recounts the course and resolution of litigation in Newport, 
Oregon, from 1999 to 2002 that challenged the proposed merger of a 
Roman Catholic health system and a governmental, local hospital district.2  
Although the merger may simply be seen as one more instance of the 
pattern of mergers in the health care3 industry during the past decade,4 the 
issues raised in the Newport case are of considerable significance for 
several reasons.  
First, the underlying agreement between a governmental hospital district, 
Pacific Communities Health District (the Health District), and a religious 
entity, the Providence Health System (Providence),5 raised constitutional 
questions as to whether and how a religiously affiliated health care system 
could merge with a public hospital district, exercising the latter’s 
governmental prerogatives of taxation and governance.6  The issue was 
unavoidable because the terms of the agreement between the two hospitals 
committed the parties to respect Providence’s “mission and values,” a 
phrase that included the Ethical and Religious Directives on Health Care of 
the American Catholic Bishops Association (the Directives).7  The Newport 
case also raised serious questions as to the economic and service 
responsibilities of a public body, since the Health District would be 
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transferring twenty-five million dollars in assets and annual revenues 
without corresponding consideration. 
Second, the exact nature of the religious issue in the case became difficult 
to identify.  It might have been the simple fact of including religion in the 
agreement in post-merger services, or it might have been the nature of the 
corporation receiving the benefits from the agreement.  That corporation, 
Providence, as a religious entity was a matter of dispute.  Providence’s 
buildings, services, and personnel are much like those of any large, 
effective health care system, sectarian or nonsectarian.  However, its bylaws 
and corporate mission are different, as noted above, because they are 
subject to the Directives, although the significance of these to a patient is 
hardly self-evident.  In addition, the impact on staff is equally unclear.8  
Thus, much of the proof and advocacy related to how religion assumed 
importance in the case.  
 Third, the procedural aspects of the litigation, as well as its outcome, 
have considerable significance for similar litigation and mergers elsewhere.  
Although the Newport litigation might have been expected to reach a 
resolution on its pleadings or by summary judgment, it went through full 
discovery and a two-week trial.  Thus, the Newport case provides one 
scenario for how such a trial might proceed.9 
 A few surprising aspects of the Newport litigation should be noted at the 
outset.  There were extensive factual disputes concerning the effect of a 
merger with a religious hospital on services provided, the religious nature of 
the parties, and the fiscal need or wisdom of the agreement.  Also, the 
arrangement in Newport, which entailed transferring assets and operations 
to a religious entity while keeping the governmental shell intact, meant that 
the agreement could be understood as tending to establish religion, either by 
preferential treatment of religion or by putting religion in charge of 
government, a distinction that made a difference in which case law was 
relied upon.10  Alternatively, the agreement could be seen as preferring one 
religion over others, thereby chilling the free exercise of religion and that, 
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again, would invoke a separate body of case law.11  Another surprising 
aspect was that while the religious mission of Providence (“the healing 
ministry of Jesus”12) permeated the entire corporate entity and was openly 
espoused in its literature, there was testimony that Providence did not 
enforce the Directives.13  Finally, a continuing and obvious, but 
unappreciated, difficulty was proving a future status or consequence, i.e., 
that the merger agreement would ultimately lead to establishing religion or 
denying procreative rights.  The difficulty here was that no witness could 
testify as to future consequences, yet these possibilities were central to the 
litigation.14 
 While these features of the case were noteworthy, the central task of all 
public interest litigation is to convert abstract constitutional principles into 
detailed proof, through live witnesses in an actual courtroom, talking about 
abstractions such as “entanglement,” “effect,” and “corporate culture” as 
though they were palpable facts.  Such substance must turn on procedure: 
qualifying expert witnesses on public health, reproductive health services, 
and Church practices; offering photographs of hospital walls with crucifixes 
and hospital brochures with religious references; or presenting testimony 
concerning the impact of the Ethical and Religious Directives on the course 
of negotiations.  In these ways, the abstractions of constitutional or public 
interest litigation take corporeal form to walk and speak in a specific 
courtroom in a given case.  
The “separate but equal” doctrine in Brown v. Board of Education,15 the 
importance of counsel in Miranda v. Arizona,16 or the risk of advising 
husbands of intended abortions in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,17 are all 
matters of abstract constitutional theory.  But they are also the stuff of 
human existence.  Their presence in a case and their importance in the lives 
of litigants must be proven in a human, tangible way.  Thus, this article will 
explore in some detail the way in which witness testimony unfolded in the 
Newport case because that process is essential to legal theory, and because 
the problems and resolutions are likely to recur elsewhere.    
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B.  An Overview of the Facts18 
Providence is a Roman Catholic enterprise and a major provider of health 
care through insurance, hospitals, and clinics in the Pacific Northwest.  The 
Health District is a small governmental “special district,” like a school, 
water, or fire district, located in Newport, Oregon.  The Health District 
operates a hospital and several clinics, with twenty-five million dollars in 
assets and an operating income of twenty-five million dollars; it is a 
relatively small provider of health care.  In 1999, the two institutions 
developed an “affiliation agreement” that later went through several major 
amendments, providing for a transfer of facilities, personnel, and services to 
Providence, which would then operate the facilities through the Health 
District while continuing to tax the district’s citizens.   
A group of citizens (the Ad Hoc Committee) became concerned that they 
would lose local governance of their health care institutions and that 
services would be curtailed in light of the religious principles of the Roman 
Catholic Church.  The group held meetings, exchanged correspondence, and 
planned litigation.19  Ultimately, it was not the citizens but the two hospitals 
that filed a suit seeking to validate the agreement in the form of a 
declaratory proceeding.  Settlement negotiations failed, and the case went to 
trial in December of 2000.  Providence and the Health District both filed 
briefs with the court.  The day before the Ad Hoc Committee’s brief was 
due, Providence and the Health District withdrew their suit.  Granting their 
request, the court dismissed the case without prejudice, which led to an 
appeal that was later withdrawn.20 
This capsule summary provides the basis for the following account of the 
merger agreement, the issues raised, the development of the litigation and 
pleadings, the evidence offered at trial, and the post-trial proceedings.  
Throughout the litigation, the position of the merging hospitals was that 
they would provide good health care, the agreement was sound and 
necessary, and Catholic principles were not material.  The Ad Hoc 
Committee took the opposite position on the latter two points, arguing that 
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the merger was not economically necessary or sound; that it would restrict 
existing or potential health care due to the governing Roman Catholic 
principles; and that the transfer of the Health District property and 
operations would tend to favor Catholics and discriminate against non-
Catholics. 
Central to the arguments of both sides was to what extent Providence’s 
Roman Catholic principles would affect the Health District’s delivery of 
health care services.  
II.  THE ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES OF ROMAN CATHOLIC 
HEALTH CARE 
A.  The Directives as Governance 
The Roman Catholic Bishops Association began developing policies for 
Roman Catholic health care in the mid-1970s, publishing a set of Ethical 
and Religious Directives for Catholic health care services in 1994 that were 
refined and further modified during the course of the Newport litigation.21  
The Directives are a highly sophisticated, well-articulated, and coherent set 
of imperatives reflecting the application of Roman Catholic theology to 
Roman Catholic health care institutions.  More importantly, they also 
represent a political attempt by the Catholic clerical hierarchy to assert its 
authority over the Catholic hospital hierarchy in the marketplace of health 
care.  Because Catholic hospitals must compete in the competitive, secular 
business of health services, inevitably, from the perspective of the bishops, 
the values and the teachings of the Catholic Church may be compromised.  
The Directives are specifically designed to counter that problem and 
insulate Catholic hospitals, the billions of dollars in assets and income they 
represent, and the millions of patients they serve. 
It was not clear at the beginning of the Newport case exactly what impact 
the Directives might have if the merger were to go forward.  The teachings 
of Catholic theology are clear: abortions, assisted suicide, reproductive 
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surgery, and artificial reproductive techniques are forbidden; in addition, 
family counseling emphasizes natural methods of childbirth. 22  All of this is 
understood, as a matter of Catholic theology.  But the extent to which these 
dictates would operate within the hospital walls of the Health District was 
far from clear.  The agreement formulated by the two hospitals required the 
Health District to accept “Providence’s values,” but it was not a self-evident 
reference to the Directives.23  Even if it was, that reference did not 
necessarily mean that the Directives would actually control the staff and 
services in practice.   
Discovery revealed an affirmative answer to these questions: the 
Directives are part of Providence’s articles of incorporation, and as such, 
they are binding on all staff throughout Providence, including the staff of 
the proposed merger.  And even if existing services in Newport did not 
include services barred by the Directives, the existence of the Directives 
would prevent such services from being developed or offered in the future.  
For example, the French abortifacient, RU486, was becoming available in 
the United States as the litigation progressed.  A fair question was whether 
it would be made available in Newport if the merger were effected.  On 
deposition, the answer by Providence officials was a clear “no.”  The 
Directives would certainly influence and restrict future health services in the 
district. 
Thus, it is necessary to examine the Directives more closely.  It should be 
noted that the Directives were being reviewed and toughened by the bishops 
as this litigation was underway.  In fact, many of the concerns expressed by 
the Ad Hoc Committee were shared by the Catholic bishops, but for 
different reasons.  Paradoxically, both were concerned with how Catholic 
teachings would come to play a role in Newport: the Ad Hoc Committee 
feared too much religious influence, and the bishops feared too little.   
At the time of the litigation, the Directives contained separate “principles 
governing cooperation.”24  These principles pertained directly to corporate 
mergers, as did the section titled “Forming New Partnerships with Health 
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Care Organizations and Providers.”25  The essence of the concerns in that 
section had to do with what is referred to as “scandal” in arrangements like 
the one proposed in Newport.  By “scandal,” the bishops and the Directives 
mean an organized compromise of the religious identity of hospitals and a 
lessened adherence to Church teachings and precepts.26  The introductory 
comments to the “Forming New Partnerships” section reflected a 
sophisticated awareness of the interrelated nature of health care systems and 
the ways in which Catholic providers become enmeshed therein:   
Until recently, most health care providers enjoyed a degree of 
independence from one another.  In ever increasing ways, Catholic 
health care providers have become involved with other health care 
organizations and providers. 
* * * 
[N]ew partnerships can pose serious challenges to the viability of 
the identity of Catholic health care institutions and services, and 
their ability to implement these Directives in a consistent way, 
especially when partnerships are formed with those who do not 
share Catholic moral principles.  The risk of scandal cannot be 
underestimated when partnerships are not built upon common 
values and moral principles.  Partnership opportunities for some 
Catholic health care providers may even threaten the continued 
existence of other Catholic institutions and services, particularly 
when partnerships are driven by financial considerations alone.  
Because of the potential dangers involved in the new partnerships 
that are emerging, an increased collaboration among Catholic-
sponsored health care institutions is essential and should be sought 
before other forms of partnerships.27 
As these introductory observations indicate, the Catholic bishops had a 
legitimate and sophisticated concern that market forces and the imperatives 
of competition, as a necessity for survival, might cause Catholic health care 
institutions to compromise their theological principles or abandon their 
moral base. 
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The Directives themselves confirm the bishops’ concerns and their effort 
to maintain a strong voice in the management and provision of health care 
services.  One directive provides that “[d]ecisions that may lead to serious 
consequences for the identity or reputation of Catholic health care services, 
or entail the high risk of scandal, should be made in consultation with the 
diocesan bishop or his health care liaison.”28   Another requires a bishop’s 
approval for any partnership that will affect the mission or religious identity 
of a Catholic provider.29  Similarly, participation in such partnerships must 
be limited to what is “in accord with the moral principles governing 
cooperation.”30  Yet another directive is clear and categorical: Catholic 
health care organizations are not permitted to engage in immediate material 
cooperation in actions that are intrinsically immoral, such as abortion, 
euthanasia, assisted suicide, and direct sterilization.31     
On one hand, these Directives are traditional religious imperatives meant 
to bind individuals; on the other hand, they are designed to apply to 
corporate, commercial, or institutional transactions.  The Directives import 
a moral imperative and dynamic that would be difficult even for the most 
sophisticated corporate executive to implement.  Further, they pose the very 
real danger of moral ambiguity by drawing distinctions between “formal” 
and “material” cooperation, as well as between “immediate” and “mediate” 
material cooperation, which constitute lines between right and wrong.  The 
distinctions may be unclear; the consequence is not.  Catholic institutions 
and executives in partnership with non-Catholic institutions, such as the 
merger proposed in Newport, risk moral error and condemnation.   
The practices that might lead to this condemnation are delineated in the 
Directives.  The bishops emphasize the “healing mission” of Jesus Christ, 
beginning with his acts of healing during his lifetime and proceeding 
through the teachings of St. Paul to extrapolate a mission for Catholic health 
care in the modern world, particularly in serving the poor and the family.32  
The diocesan bishop, who exercises responsibilities that are rooted in his 
office as pastor, teacher, and priest, implements the mission.33   By this 
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declaration, then, the church hierarchy and its representative, the local 
bishop, are placed squarely in the context and control of Catholic health 
care institutions throughout the country.   
B.  The Directives as Religion 
The content of moral Catholic health care is spelled out in the Directives.  
The preamble speaks of addressing Catholic providers in institutional 
settings, starting with a general introduction that recaps the healing ministry 
of Jesus, addressing the imperatives of serving the poor, reaching the spirit 
as well as the body, and specifically involving both laity and the local 
bishop.34  Part I of this article deals with the social responsibility of Catholic 
health care services; specifically, the first directive declares that Catholic 
institutions “must be animated by the Gospel of Jesus”;35 another directive 
provides that “Catholic health care services must adopt these Directives as 
policy, require adherence to them within the institution as a condition for 
medical privileges and employment, and provide appropriate instruction 
regarding the directives for administration, medical and nursing staff, and 
other personnel.”36  
The Directives also deal with “The Professional-Patient Relationship.”37  
The introduction to that section reads as follows:  
When the health care professional and the patient use institutional 
Catholic health care, they also accept its public commitment to the 
[C]hurch’s understanding of and witness to the dignity of the 
human person.  The [C]hurch’s moral teaching on health care 
nurtures a truly interpersonal professional-patient relationship.  
This professional-patient relationship is never separated, then, 
from the Catholic identity of the health care institution.38 
These policies are made operational in the directives that follow.  For 
example, in Directive 24, the bishops declare that a Catholic health care 
institution “will not honor an advance directive that is contrary to Catholic 
teaching.”39  Similarly, the Directives provide that a woman who has been 
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raped should be treated with medications to prevent ovulation or 
fertilization if there is no evidence that conception has occurred.40  And 
further, it is not permissible “to initiate or to recommend treatments that 
have as their purpose or direct effect the removal, destruction, or 
interference with the implantation of a fertilized ovum.”41 
The significance of Catholic religious teaching becomes perhaps clearest 
in Part IV, “Issues in Care for the Beginning of Life.”  That section 
provides that the Church cannot approve contraceptive interventions that 
either purposefully or resultingly render procreation impossible.42  
Similarly, “[r]eproductive technologies that substitute for the marriage act 
are not consistent with human dignity.”43  Thus, artificial insemination, in 
vitro fertilization, and surrogacy are forbidden.44  One directive states 
unequivocally, “Abortion . . . is never permitted.”45  The concerns 
motivating the prohibition on abortion also motivate the directive that 
forbids promoting or condoning contraceptive practices,46 including direct 
sterilization for men or women, as well as the directive that forbids prenatal 
diagnosis for the purpose of aborting children with birth defects.47 
Not surprisingly, in the section of the Directives titled “Issues in Care for 
the Dying,” Roman Catholic teaching is emphatically impressed upon 
Catholic health care institutions.48  Catholic theology teaches eternal life, 
but also that life-prolonging procedures may be rejected if “insufficiently 
beneficial or excessively burdensome.”49  However, the introduction to this 
section reads, “Suicide and euthanasia are never morally acceptable 
options.”50  Directive 57 does recognize that a person may choose to “forgo 
extraordinary or disproportionate means of preserving life.”51  Moreover, 
the informed judgment of “a competent adult patient concerning the use or 
withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures should always be respected and 
normally complied with, unless it is contrary to Catholic moral teaching.”52  
The Directives draw the line against euthanasia, defining it as “an action or 
omission that of itself or by intention causes death in order to alleviate 
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suffering.”53  The bar is absolute: “Catholic health care institutions may 
never condone or participate in euthanasia or assisted suicide in any way.”54 
By their very terms, the Directives are obligatory upon health care 
institutions, particularly those that might form new partnerships with non-
Catholic institutions.  It is easy and dangerous to ignore the profoundly 
revolutionary nature of the Directives.  Moral and ethical teachings of the 
Church have long guided individual communicants of the Catholic faith, but 
the Directives transform those teachings and principles from matters of 
individual adherence to matters of corporate and community policy.   
Health care institutions that are formed or operated in partnership with 
Roman Catholic health care providers do not cease to be community 
institutions simply by reason of their religious affiliation.  They remain 
community institutions, receiving fire, police, zoning, and tax benefits, as 
well as Medicare and Medicaid funding from a community that is not solely 
Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, or Muslim but that is a pluralistic, political 
community in a secular nation.   
Over the past thirty years, Catholic and all other health care institutions in 
this country have become major beneficiaries of public programs of tax 
policy and health finance, including Medicare and Medicaid.  These 
programs do not come with religious tests or content.  Catholic health care 
institutions, licensed and supported by the public, have a mission to serve in 
the public interest.  
The Directives pose a direct challenge to this public responsibility.  
Clearly, religious groups may practice their faith and be guided by it.  
Additionally, if they accept no public benefit, they need accept no public 
burdens.  But the very purpose of the Directives is to respond to a health 
care context that, over the past decades, has interwoven all providers into a 
complex health care tapestry.  This entanglement poses the danger of 
“scandal”55 precisely because there is no escape; all hospitals, including 
Catholic hospitals, are in a sense “public.” 
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The conflict resulting between the independence of religious institutions 
and the public responsibility of every hospital was at the heart of the 
Newport litigation.  The central issue was how the Catholic principles 
would impact the Health District and its community through the merger 
agreement.  While the language of the Directives is clear, if they are not 
implemented, nothing, arguably, is lost: no harm, no foul.  Transferring 
assets and authority to a religious entity, such as Providence, violates the 
First Amendment only if it serves religious purposes or assists Providence’s 
religious mission.   
Thus, the nature of the Directives is important only in the consequences 
of those directives to the Health District and the services and people 
affected.  The bishops’ fears are real, given the nature of health care in the 
twenty-first century, but not every relationship involves scandal or sin.  
Competition and the ability to serve God turns at least partly, on the 
agreement effected between the Health District and Providence. 
III.  THE MERGER AGREEMENT 
A.  The Parties 
On June 5, 2000, Pacific Communities Health District (the Health 
District), and Providence Health System, Oregon (Providence), an Oregon 
charitable, not-for-profit corporation, finalized an Operating Agreement.56  
The Health District is an Oregon municipal corporation.57  It is a 
governmental unit created under state law with elected officials, the power 
of eminent domain, and taxing authority.   
At the time of the agreement, the Health District was profitable.  The 
Health District owns a general hospital, with forty-eight beds, as well as 
related health care facilities in Newport, Oregon.58  It also operates 
outpatient clinics in Newport and in the neighboring towns of Walport, 
Depoe Bay, and Toledo.59  While the Health District would be considered a 
small health care provider, it did offer a full range of services, with the 
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exception of abortions, which became significant later.  However, in the 
realm of reproductive services, the hospital and the clinics did make 
available family planning and reproductive services, including laparoscopy. 
Providence, in contrast, is a major provider of health care in the Pacific 
Northwest, with millions in assets and tens of thousands of employees.60  
The specific party to the agreement was Providence Health System, 
Oregon.61  The Oregon unit of Providence has a health plan insurance 
company, four hospitals, a number of treatment facilities, and several clinics 
mostly in western Oregon and chiefly in the Portland area.62  Also, by all 
accounts, its services are high quality.  Significantly, Providence is a 
Roman Catholic organization and, by a specific provision in its articles of 
incorporation, its services are subject to the Directives of the Roman 
Catholic Church as summarized above.63  Consequently, Providence did not 
offer a range of services that would otherwise have been offered by a 
general provider of health care.   
It may be worth noting that the National Catholic Bishops Association 
was not itself a party to the Operating Agreement.64  This is significant 
because the Bishops’ Council, the group of Catholic bishops responsible for 
drafting the Directives, has interests that diverge from those of Catholic 
health care providers such as Providence.  The providers function in a 
competitive marketplace.  The Bishops’ Council operates in a world of 
theology and church-based politics; it is suspicious of the motives and 
initiatives of Catholic health care systems.  For instance, it became apparent 
through discovery and trial that the health care providers and the Bishops’ 
Council were, in many respects, more at odds with one another than the 
litigants themselves. 
The litigants included the parties to the Operating Agreement (the Health 
District and Providence) on one side and an Ad Hoc Committee of citizens 
on the other.  The Ad Hoc Committee consisted of ten citizens from the 
Newport area, two of whom had served on the board of the Health District.  
The Ad Hoc Committee was diverse.  One member had been the director of 
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social services for the county, another had set up reproductive counseling 
services for the state of Oregon, another was a nurse, another was a social 
worker, and another (the only male) was a businessman and real estate 
developer.  The Ad Hoc Committee’s concerns about the agreement 
included the following: the loss of local governance, the inadequate 
economic terms, the potential loss of services, and the merger of private 
religious and governmental interests contrary to the state and federal 
constitutions.  The spectrum of concerns was quite broad, and the Ad Hoc 
Committee made it clear that they were not an abortion rights group.  
Because Newport is a small, isolated, coastal community, the members of 
the Ad Hoc Committee were well acquainted with the executives, staff, and 
governing board of the Health District.  Moreover, they came to know the 
administrators of Providence either through negotiating sessions or pretrial 
discovery proceedings.  Inevitably, personalities bruised, nerves became 
frayed, and hostility was generated.  In a small community, the proposed 
merger loomed large and exacerbated the pressure cooker quality of the 
litigation. 
B.  The Terms of the Agreement 
The agreement povided that “[p]ursuant to ORS 440.360, the [Health] 
District is authorized to enter into business arrangements and relationships 
with public or private entities….”65  There were further recitals to the effect 
that the Health District had decided that there were “clinical, economic and 
administrative synergies to be gained by affiliating with a major health care 
system,” and the Health District had decided that Providence qualified.66  
The Operating Agreement between the Health District and Providence 
had been called an “Affiliation Agreement” in an earlier iteration.67  
Counsel for the Ad Hoc Committee had sent, in February of 2000, a lengthy 
letter that critiqued the document.68  In response, the Health District and 
Providence revised the document in significant ways, entitling it an 
“Operating Agreement” instead.69  Significantly, the earlier Affiliation 
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Agreement had made specific references to Providence’s adherence to the 
Roman Catholic Ethical and Religious Directives;70 these references were 
deleted in the subsequent Operating Agreement.71 
The final agreement, the one that was ultimately challenged at trial, was 
not styled as a merger agreement; rather, it was styled as an operating 
agreement.  Indeed, the form of the agreement provided that Providence 
would simply be “operating” the health care services of the Health District 
on behalf of the Health District.  Such a management agreement, if it had 
been genuine, might well have survived the challenge.  A religious manager 
can serve just as well as a sectarian manager so long as the services are 
managed in a nonsectarian fashion.  Under a true operating agreement, 
Providence would simply receive a fee, possibly a commission, for 
operating the Health District’s services, property, and employees. 
Instead of a simple transaction fee for a service, the Operating Agreement 
transferred far more than operating control to Providence.  The Health 
District was substantially merged into Providence; Providence was granted 
not only all of the Health District’s facilities, personnel, patients, operations 
and income, but also the Health District’s taxing power.  The governing 
board of the Health District would continue to exist but as a subunit of 
Providence.  Governmental capabilities of the Health District, notably 
taxation power, were now subject to Providence’s control.  If it was an 
operating agreement, it was so only in the sense that Providence would 
operate the government. 
1.  Transfers to Providence 
All Health District facilities, personnel, revenues, and services were to be 
transferred to Providence, whose consideration in return would be to 
operate them and to keep revenues.  The agreement was to be a cooperative 
effort in which “Providence is responsible for providing local health care 
services at the Hospital and the [Health] District provides the facilities in 
which that can occur and monitors the performance by Providence of its 
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duties under this agreement.”72  The recitals went on to provide that 
Providence and the Health District would cooperate to provide support to 
each other, and that Providence was “committed to sustaining and 
enhancing the depth and breadth of those services now offered by the 
[Health] District.”73  The recitals emphasized Providence’s goal to conduct 
local decision making for the governance and leadership of the hospital.74 
The agreement went on further to describe its terms.  A lease for all of 
the Health District property was provided in the agreement.  The name of 
the hospital was to be changed to “Providence Pacific Communities 
Hospital.”75  The term of the agreement was to be from July 1, 2000, to 
December 31, 2029.76  On the effective date of the agreement, the Health 
District was to transfer its current assets and liabilities to Providence, with 
certain exclusions provided later in the agreement.77  The Health District 
was to retain all long-term assets, liabilities, and restricted funds, including 
title to and ownership of the leased property, the capital improvement and 
replacement funds, and liability for general obligation refunding bonds.78 
The agreement further provided that Providence would use and operate 
the leased property for the purposes of a general acute care hospital and 
outpatient clinics in the central coast service area.79  Providence was 
forbidden from using the leased property or any working capital for any 
other purpose without prior written consent from the Health District.80  
Presumably, this requirement was written to forestall transfer of property or 
application of proceeds to some of Providence’s other hospitals or facilities 
elsewhere in the state.   
2.  The Parties’ Obligations 
The transfers to Providence were substantial in value, scope, and 
quantity.  In exchange for receiving all of the facilities and services of the 
Health District, Providence agreed to operate those facilities and services.  
This point bears restating: the consideration (i.e., payment) from Providence 
for the Health District’s transfer was that they would accept the transfer and 
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operate the facilities.  The benefits of the agreement for Providence seemed 
to outweigh those for the Health District.  While Providence undertook 
other ill-defined obligations, there was no quid pro quo for millions of 
dollars in value transferred by the Health District. 
On the effective date of the agreement, Providence was to establish a 
board known as the Central Coast Service Area Community Council (the 
Community Council).81  Its function was to provide leadership and 
oversight of health care operations within the Health District.82  The 
agreement specifically provided that the Community Council was not a 
legal entity; rather, it was created to assist in the “governance and 
management” of Providence.83  It is important to note that the agreement 
provided that the Community Council “shall operate in accordance with the 
policies, mission, and values of Providence.”84  This statement appears to be 
an oblique reference to the Directives.  
The functions of the Community Council were to provide oversight of the 
quality improvement programs, to provide a credential link between the 
Health District and Providence, to review and approve amendments to 
medical staff bylaws, and to [t]ake appropriate action with regard to other 
responsibilities as may be delegated by the Board of Providence from time 
to time.”85  The Community Council was also to provide “advice, counsel 
and direction” concerning community needs for health services, facility 
operations, financial performance, and strategic direction for the central 
coast area.86  Significantly, the Community Council was to recruit for 
membership responsible persons who shared the mission and values of 
Providence,87 which was another indirect reference to the Directives.  The 
members of the Community Council were to be appointed by Providence in 
consultation with the Community Council.88  The Council was to have at 
least eleven members with no more than two members appointed by the 
Health District.89 
During the lifetime of the agreement, the Health District’s board would 
continue to exist but in a subordinate role.  The board would receive and 
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review reports and information concerning the delivery of health care 
services submitted by the Community Council or Providence.90  The Health 
District’s board would also monitor Providence’s performance and submit 
any requested changes in goals, objectives, health care service delivery, or 
operations of the Health District to Providence and the Community 
Council.91  Additionally, the board would review and approve all master site 
development and facility plans or projects created by Providence involving 
total expenditures in excess of twenty-five thousand dollars.92   
Providence would determine the feasibility of extending its health plan 
and managed-care options to the central coast service area and would also 
seek to maintain an open physician panel in that region.93  In order to make 
that determination, Providence would undertake several obligations.  For 
example, Providence would establish and maintain a community cancer 
center, as feasible; it would determine the feasibility of radiation therapy 
services in the central coast service area between 2004 and 2009; and it 
would conduct periodic assessments of health services in the central coast 
service area by determining the feasibility of many of those services and 
assessing the need for medical office space.94  Curiously, Providence would 
also seek to obtain the release of the Health District from its obligations 
under agreements with physicians and various departments including 
pathology, radiology, emergency medicine, and electrocardiography.95 
Providence’s level of control is evidenced by the provision in the 
agreement that provided, “Providence shall be responsible for the total 
operation of the hospital.”96  Moreover, the agreement provided that 
Providence could adopt its own employment policies with respect to 
employees, and that “Providence shall offer employment, at Providence 
Pacific Communities Hospital, at their current level of compensation to all 
current employees of [the] District of the Effective Date, in accordance with 
Providence’s standard policies and procedures.”97  
The recital of the Health District’s responsibilities was brief in 
comparison to the recital of Providence’s responsibilities.  Significantly, 
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there were two provisions that later raised concern.  First, the Health 
District was obligated to “[u]se its best efforts to maintain its operating tax 
levy on all taxable property within the jurisdictional boundaries of the 
District in order to provide the funds needed by the District to support the 
District’s operations and fund the provision of indigent care and other 
services by Providence….”98  Second, the Health District was required to 
“[m]aintain primary responsibility for financing all master site development 
and capital construction and improvements….”99  To this end, the Health 
District would use its best efforts to obtain voter approval of general 
obligation bonds, and it might request “financial assistance from Providence 
for master site development and capital construction and improvements.”100 
Two financial undertakings are significant.  One was by Providence to 
invest not less than one million dollars in a mutually acceptable project for 
new diagnostic or therapeutic capabilities within twenty-four months.101  
The investment was to be drawn from funds other than working capital or 
revenues generated in the central coast service area.102  The second 
undertaking involved the parties’ agreement to cooperate in an effort to 
maintain the district-operating tax levy.  From that levy, $450,000 would be 
allocated to reimburse Providence for charity care, uncompensated 
Medicaid and Medicare charges, community health programs, medical 
education, and residency training.103  The total tax levy was estimated to be 
approximately $560,000.104 
The agreement provided that while the Health District retained ownership 
of all facilities, properties, and equipment, it would “commit a portion of its 
Capital Improvement and Replacement Fund (the Reserve Fund) to 
implementation of master site development . . . and the construction of 
medical office space.”105  The Reserve Fund totaled twelve million dollars 
in capital reserves, and the Health District had the right to maintain a 
balance in the Reserve Fund of only two million dollars.106 
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3.  Religious Directives 
The agreement provided that “[e]ach party will perform its duties under 
the terms of this Agreement in a manner consistent with the party’s 
philosophy, mission, policies and values.”107  Copies of these policy 
statements were appended to the Operating Agreement as Exhibit C.108  
While an earlier draft had made explicit reference to the Ethical and 
Religious Directives of the Catholic Church, the Operating Agreement and 
the appended Exhibit C carefully avoided such a reference.  The 
incorporation of the Directives only became explicitly clear as a part of 
Providence’s articles of incorporation through discovery, deposition, and 
production. 
At the end of the agreement there were provisions for termination.109  
Significantly, the agreement provided that “[i]f at any time…Providence is 
required to operate the Hospital in a manner that is not consistent with the 
philosophy, mission, policies and values of Providence,” Providence may 
terminate the agreement upon sixty days’ notice.110  If the operational 
management of the clinics placed Providence in a conflict with its 
philosophy, mission, policies, and values, the agreement provided that the 
“operation or management of the Clinics may revert to the operation or 
management of the [Health] District, if the parties mutually agree.”111  The 
agreement then provided that “[t]he parties may also consider the option of 
transitioning employed physicians to private practice as a means of 
resolution without termination of this Agreement.”112 
The agreement thus transferred all of the Health District’s facilities, 
personnel, services, and patients to Providence, where the principal 
consideration (other than creating a diagnostic center) given by Providence 
was to operate them.  Those operations would have to be consistent with 
Providence’s mission and values.  As noted, the importance of that 
consideration was reflected several times in the agreement.  The importance 
was heightened in a relatively small community where the consideration 
included not only the operation of the hospital and clinic services but also 
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rental space for the Health District’s medical offices for physicians and 
other professionals, who were required by the agreement to be members of 
the hospital’s medical staff or other health professional staff.  Thus, the 
agreement and the values it implemented would have a profound impact on 
health care services throughout the small city of Newport, the Lincoln 
County area around it, and a significant portion of the rural seacoast of 
Oregon. 
C.  Objections to the Merger Agreement 
Both earlier and final versions of the Operating Agreement raised 
objections that were communicated to the Health District’s board prior to 
the litigation in the Newport case.  On December 23, 1999, counsel for the 
Ad Hoc Committee wrote to the Health District board members to 
communicate the committee’s opposition to the earlier proposed Affiliation 
Agreement.113  The essence of the committee’s objections would also apply 
to the subsequent revision, and the objections are conveyed in the following 
quotation from that initial letter: 
In summary, the Committee’s position is that the proposed 
agreement with Providence (a) unconstitutionally transfers 
management of a public institution to a religious group, subjecting 
public assets, services and taxing authority to religious policies and 
principles; (b) unconstitutionally provides support to that same 
religious group, by that same transfer and by a continuing 
obligation to use public taxing authority to fund future operations 
and construction on Providence’s behalf, excessively entangling 
public authority with private, religious governance; (c) 
unconstitutionally curtails or burdens reproductive services and 
counseling by delegating public decision making to private, 
religious management; (d) contrary to Oregon statute, effects a 
merger and/or a partial liquidation of a public hospital district 
without required public process, review and approval and a 
delegation of District taxing authority to a private, religious group; 
[and] (e) contrary to Oregon court decisions, does so on terms so 
favorable to Providence as to constitute an abandonment of public, 
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fiduciary responsibility, beyond the authority of the officers of the 
District.114 
Following this communication, there were exchanges between counsel 
for all parties as well as an effort to make a presentation to the Health 
District’s board.  Unfortunately, the board declined to extend more than a 
few minutes on their public agenda at their regular meetings.  The 
preliminary draft of the Operating Agreement was reworked into the final, 
which was critiqued in a letter by counsel for the Ad Hoc Committee in 
similar terms to those stated above; the letter was sent to the chair of the 
Health District’s board on February 17, 2000.115   
Despite efforts at resolution, the positions of the parties did not shift, and 
litigation ensued.  But it was not, as one might anticipate, initiated by the 
objecting citizens.   
IV.  THE LITIGATION:  PRETRIAL 
A.  Pleadings 
1.  Choice of Forum 
The issues posed by the merger between Providence and the Health 
District were fairly clear.  Control and operation of a public entity by a 
religious entity raises First Amendment religion issues under the United 
States Constitution.  These issues are independent of the possible effect on 
available services and operations.  The Ad Hoc Committee argued that the 
availability of certain services would also be influenced, and this raised 
health care issues under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.  These federal concerns could also be grounded on the Oregon 
Constitution116 and could be raised by title 42 of the United States Code, 
section 1983, in either state or federal court.117  In addition, there were state 
law questions as to whether a special public district, such as the Health 
District, could be operated by a private entity.  There was also the question 
of whether the merger was a waste of public resources.  These state law 
252 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
CORPORATE ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE IN THE HEALTH CARE MARKETPLACE 
questions could be raised pendent to the constitutional issues in either 
federal or state court.118 
The possibility of filing in either federal or state court raises important 
issues involving choice of forum.  As a general matter, civil rights and 
public interest attorneys prefer federal court.119  Federal court is generally a 
better forum for civil rights litigation because it offers a more rigorous 
selection process for judges; a more favorable docket in terms of volume 
and speed; a greater array of resources available to the judge; a greater 
familiarity with constitutional issues; and insulation from such political 
issues as those that were posed in the Newport case.  In this case, the choice 
was between the Oregon Court of Appeals and the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  The Ninth Circuit was preferable for the 
reasons noted above and for its reputation as perhaps the most liberal bench 
in the federal judiciary. 
Generalizations, however, are always subject to exceptions.  A suit in 
federal court in the Newport litigation would have been assigned to the 
southern unit, which at that time also meant a conservative judge.120  An 
appeal through the Oregon Court of Appeals to the Oregon Supreme Court 
would have involved one of the most highly regarded state supreme court 
benches in the country.  A state court trial, however, would have been heard 
(as it ultimately was) by a trial judge inexperienced in complex 
constitutional issues, with a crowded docket, limited resources, and, not 
surprisingly, an equally limited patience and tolerance for the efforts of pro 
bono counsel.121  The best choice was federal court, and Portland in 
particular, which had a more favorable federal bench. 
Instead, the Health District filed in state court in Newport, Oregon.  The 
reason for this choice of forum may be surmised.  The considerations 
favoring federal court disfavored the Health District and Providence.  
Perhaps counsel were more familiar with the state court processes, which is 
often true when counsel represents local governmental units in civil rights 
cases.  Certainly another important consideration involved the logistics of 
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resources and travel.  If the case had been brought and tried in federal court 
in Portland, then counsel, support services, and many of the expert 
witnesses would have been readily at hand, convenient to the court house.  
In contrast, filing in Newport meant a three-hour drive for conferences and 
court appearances.  While this was a burden for both sides in the case, the 
financial resources of the corporations made the burden easier to bear.  The 
same was not true for uncompensated, pro bono counsel and witnesses. 
2.  State Court Petition and Notice 
As noted, the Ad Hoc Committee did not get to file its civil rights action 
in federal court.  Instead, the Health District filed in state court, seeking a 
declaratory judgment by invoking a procedure ill-adapted for resolving 
issues.  On March 15, 2000, the Health District filed a Petition for Judicial 
Examination and Judgment (the Petition),122 terming it a validation 
proceeding.123  The Health District requested the local trial court to “enter a 
judgment that all actions taken and proceedings conducted by the [Health] 
District and the Board in connection with the [Operating] Agreement are in 
compliance with the provisions of applicable laws including, without 
limitation, all relevant constitutional provisions, statutes and regulations.”124  
The Health District further prayed that a judgment be entered that the 
agreement and the transactions were “valid and legal” under the provisions 
mentioned.125 
The only parties named as plaintiffs were the members of the board of the 
Health District, the first named being Gary Hoagland.126  They sued “as the 
Board of Pacific Communities Health District.”127  There were no 
defendants, and the members of the Ad Hoc Committee were not referred to 
anywhere in the body of the Petition.128  Notice of the judicial proceeding 
was to be published, stating that a petition had been filed praying that the 
court approve proceedings of the board: 
[U]ndertaken and proposed in connection with the District’s efforts 
to enter into an operating agreement with Providence Health 
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System—Oregon (“Providence”), under which the District has 
agreed to lease and transfer operation, but not ownership, of certain 
of its real and personal property to Providence, and to transfer 
certain current assets and liabilities to Providence, in exchange for 
which Providence has agreed to use and operate such property in a 
mutually agreed upon manner and in accordance with all 
applicable laws, in order to assure that quality health care services 
continue to be available to residents of the District.129 
The notice closed by telling any interested person that he or she could 
appear and contest by filing an answer.130 
The notice gave no hint of the magnitude of the proposed merger.  
Nothing was said about the millions of dollars of annual revenues and assets 
being transferred, or that these transfers were to continue for a term 
approaching thirty years.  Nothing was said to convey the reality that 
Providence was giving little in return for these transfers, other than a 
commitment to make good faith studies and to possibly develop a 
diagnostic center.  There was no hint in the notice that the governance of the 
Health District would be radically altered under Providence’s control.  Most 
significantly, there was no suggestion that Providence operated under a set 
of religious Directives that might restrict or preclude services.  If a reader of 
the notice had gone to the clerk’s office to read the Petition, there would 
have been little in the Petition itself to alert the reader.  The Petition was 
vague, and a member of the public who ventured to read the whole Petition 
would not have been given proper notice of the significance of the issues or 
the parties to the Petition.   
The Petition had two additional exhibits.  Exhibit B was entitled 
“Principles of Affiliation” and consisted of the Health District’s generalities 
for setting criteria for selecting a merging partner, but it in no way provided 
a rigorous test for a partner or indicated whether that partner was restricted 
in religious terms.131  Exhibit C contained the Operating Agreement 
itself.132  A person who struggled through the almost seventy pages of the 
Operating Agreement might then come to another exhibit reciting the core 
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values of Providence to continue “the healing ministry of Jesus in the world 
of today.”133  Among the core values listed were compassion, justice, 
respect for the dignity of persons, excellence, and stewardship.134  There 
was no reference made to the Directives of the Catholic bishops.   
This was a curious pleading and proceeding.  The Health District 
believed, or asserted, that it was proceeding in rem, but in rem proceedings 
are generally directed toward physical objects, such as real property or boats 
when the title or disposition of the property are in controversy.  In this case, 
a whole course of past negotiations and an entire course of an 
administration and corporate merger, yet to be undertaken, were the subject 
of the validation proceeding.  The court was asked to pass judgment on the 
transfer of a complex business, involving millions of dollars in assets and 
proceeds, thousands of patients, and the merger of a governmental unit into 
a religious corporation.  The state statutes invoked were actually intended, 
and previously used, only to resolve specific and limited municipal action 
such as the building of a public building or the imposition of a specific 
tax.135  Clearly, the corporate merger proposed between the Health District 
and Providence was quite different.  It presented an ongoing, flexible 
relationship of unclear scope, duration, and content, lasting for decades.  
 Most significantly, an in rem or declaratory procedure must be 
accompanied by the best notice possible and must be calculated to alert the 
greatest number of interested parties.136  For the Newport case, this certainly 
would have included people in Newport as well as health care providers 
elsewhere in the state.  But the notice published was opaque at best and 
deceptive in its suggestion that the proposed agreement and declaratory 
judgment were routine matters of little consequence.  On the morning of the 
hearing challenging the notice, the defense counsel for the Ad Hoc 
Committee stopped for breakfast at the Embarcadero, a restaurant in 
Newport.  When asked why he was in town, he explained the suit and notice 
and asked the waitress if she read the local newspaper.  She replied, 
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“Regularly. But this is the first I’ve heard we were selling our hospital. 
Don’t let them get away with it.” 
B.  Responsive Pleadings 
After the Health District filed its petition to validate the proposed merger, 
Providence filed a motion to intervene.137  Plainly, the motion to intervene 
was appropriate.  Indeed, an argument could be made that the Health 
District’s petition could be dismissed for failure to join indispensable 
parties had Providence not itself intervened.138  The motion to intervene was 
granted as a routine matter. 
The Ad Hoc Committee appeared, through Corrinne Williams, Barbara 
Davidson, and Norman Johnson, and moved to dismiss.139  At this point the 
committee also became known as the “defendant.” Essentially, the grounds 
for the motion to dismiss were threefold: the notice had been 
constitutionally defective and failed to comply with U.S. Supreme Court 
case law under the due process clause; the Health District lacked statutory 
authority to effect an agreement that would transfer governance to a private 
party and transfer substantial assets without compensation; and the 
agreement would violate not only the establishment clause and the freedom 
of religion clause of the state and federal constitutions, but would also 
violate the provisions assuring rights of personal autonomy and 
reproductive choice.140  The motion to dismiss also contended that the 
agreement would restrict services either presently provided or possibly 
desired in the future, because of the religious principles of Providence, as 
articulated in the Directives.141  
The procedural challenge, particularly to the deficiencies in the notice, 
seemed well taken.  For purposes of raising that challenge, the Ad Hoc 
Committee carefully filed a special appearance.  The substantive challenges 
were well grounded, but it was possible that the judge believed that the facts 
needed to be developed by discovery and further arguments on motions for 
summary judgment.  That is what ultimately happened, but a decision 
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granting the motion to dismiss seemed appropriate because on its face the 
Operating Agreement turns over not only assets but also the government 
itself to a religiously affiliated and governed body.  The Operating 
Agreement and the case seemed well designed for a ruling on the face of the 
pleadings, dismissing the Health District’s claim.  However, the motion to 
dismiss was denied.  No reasons were given. 
On June 8, 2000, the Ad Hoc Committee filed an answer and 
counterclaim.142  The answer detailed the services that were presently 
available through the Health District as follows: 
Presently, the [Health] District offers an array of in-patient, out-
patient and clinic health care services, including surgery.  It has, or 
could develop, the capability of providing facilities and services 
involving contraception, family planning, birth, reproductive 
[services], sex education, sterilization, abortion, end of life, 
withdrawing life support and physician assisted suicide and has, or 
could, develop community and professional education programs 
concerning these subjects.  The [Health] District has public, 
fiduciary and statutory authority and responsibility in these matters 
for its residents, such as [the] defendant[].  While these 
responsibilities may be shared with other agencies, they may not 
be abandoned or wholly delegated by the [Health] District under 
Oregon law.143 
The answer also made specific reference to the importance of the 
Directives to the Providence health system and to the proposed agreement, 
as follows: 
The Agreement several times, by its express terms, requires that all 
operations under the Agreement shall be consistent with 
Providence’s philosophy, mission, policy and values, which are 
thus made binding on the District, under the agreement.  As a 
Roman Catholic Church sanctioned health care provider, 
Providence’s mission, policies, philosophy and values are subject 
to the authority of the Roman Catholic Church and its American 
Bishops Conference’s Ethical and Religious Directives.  Though 
these are not fully presented in the Agreement, an earlier version 
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expressly referred to the Catholic Church’s publication of the 
Ethical and Religious Directives (Exhibit A), developed by the 
American Bishops Conference, governing health care and detailed 
the full scope of their operational implications upon the District’s 
health services.  
Providence and the Sisters of Providence are required by Roman 
Catholic doctrine to limit and/or prohibit in significant ways the 
full range of medical or health care services they might offer under 
Oregon law.  These limitations restrict and/or prohibit services and 
personnel in the areas delineated . . . above.  These restrictions 
apply throughout the Providence system, including its managed 
care and contracted services, its leased facilities and those 
occupying them.  Under the proposed Agreement, the District’s 
facilities, services and personnel will become part of the 
Providence system, and therefore subject to the Ethical Directives.  
In addition to the restriction on services, the imposition of religious 
administrative authority will restrict religious freedom of Catholic 
employees and non-Catholic employees.144 
The answer then went on to allege the factual basis for the constitutional 
and statutory objections to the merger agreement, as follows: 
Defendant[] believe[s] and allege[s] that the Agreement with 
Providence (A) transfers governmental assets to a religious group, 
making it a more viable entity; (B) visibly and symbolically 
identifies governmental authority, facilities and services as those of 
a religious group; (C) tends to establish religion and prefer one 
religion over another; (D) subjects government authority and state 
treasuries funds to a private religious group; (E) excessively 
entangles government and religion in the administration of 
services, personnel and facilities; (F) restricts present and future 
health care services and decision making along religious lines; (G) 
will deter people from seeking such services in the future, placing 
an undue burden on their rights to those services; and (H) divides 
the community politically along religious issues. 
Defendant[] believe[s] and allege[s], under the Agreement, that 
those seeking services detailed … above will have to travel to seek 
them outside the [Health] District, at considerable expense, delay 
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and difficulty.  They may ultimately be deterred from seeking 
those services, constituting an undue burden on those patients.  
Further, those services detailed . . . may become effectively 
unavailable anywhere in Oregon if the [Health] District completes 
its Agreement with the Sisters of Providence, as part of 
Providence’s pattern and practice of aggressively acquiring other 
hospitals in Oregon and the Pacific Northwest.  This process of 
acquisition now reaches previously independent medical groups in 
the Newport area, by sale or contract with the [Health] District.145 
Providence would operate the Health District’s facilities subject to 
Roman Catholic limitations, and the Ad Hoc Committee had a direct 
interest in the matter, as taxpayers, residents, professionals in the fields of 
social services, health care and health care administration, and former 
members of the District Board of Directors.  
The first claim for relief in the answer and counterclaim was that the 
Operating Agreement established religious entanglement by transferring 
governance to Providence, by transferring assets which would strengthen 
Providence financially, and by committing taxing and bonding authority to 
Providence.146  The second claim was that the merger agreement was 
subject to Roman Catholic values, which would restrict, on religious 
grounds, the availability of health services and infringe on the freedom of 
religion while limiting constitutionally grounded rights to health care and 
reproductive freedom.147  These limitations pertained to health care rights, 
both at the beginning and at end of life, and to the rights and interests not 
only of patients but also of hospital and clinic employees.  A third claim 
alleged that the Health District Web site had maintained a public forum 
function but had excluded the Ad Hoc Committee from access and 
participation.148 
The Ad Hoc Committee concluded by seeking relief in the form of 
damages, injunctions, and attorney’s fees, preventing the Health District 
and Providence from executing or carrying out the proposed agreement.  In 
addition, the Ad Hoc Committee sought a constructive trust on the Health 
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District reserve fund, amounting to eight million dollars, to prevent it from 
being transferred to Providence.  They requested a trial by jury on all of the 
claims for relief.149  Appended to the Ad Hoc Committee’s answer and 
counterclaim were the Directives.150  These were incorporated by reference.  
They had not been included, or even mentioned, in the Petition or 
Providence’s motion to intervene.   
The District and Providence responded to the Ad Hoc Committee’s 
answer and counterclaim.  The responses primarily consisted of denials of 
recitations that the petitioners (the hospitals) lacked requisite knowledge or 
information sufficient to form a belief.  Significantly, petitioners did admit 
that the Directives are part of the philosophy, mission and values of 
Providence Health Systems of Oregon, and that Providence would operate 
the Health District as part of its larger health care system.  The petitioners 
also admitted that lawful abortions would not presently violate the terms of 
employment at the Health District hospital and that therapeutic abortions 
had been performed from time to time, but that after the effective date of the 
operating agreement, Providence would not perform direct151 abortions at 
the hospital or clinics.152 
The final phase of the pretrial pleadings involved cross-motions for 
summary judgment.  These were preceded by extensive discovery in the 
form of production of documents and depositions of various individuals.   
C.  Discovery 
In a sense, the merger agreement between Providence and the Health 
District posed no factual issues for discovery.  The conduct of the plaintiffs 
was clear: they had effected an agreement, and the agreement spoke for 
itself, as did the articles of incorporation.  Additionally, the Directives were 
clear and unambiguous on their face.  All parties agreed that these operative 
documents comprised the sum total of the relationship between the Health 
District and Providence.  The state and federal constitutional issues as to 
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religion and reproductive rights were clearly posed by the text of these 
documents.153 
Therefore, on its face, this case seemed to possess little need for 
discovery.  The parties to the agreement maintained that they had legal 
authority to consummate the arrangement and that the agreement did not 
violate statutory or constitutional provisions of Oregon or the United States.  
The opponents of the agreement argued that the agreement constituted an 
establishment of religion and the preference of a religious group; further, 
the agreement would restrict health care services.  These are legal issues 
that would not seem to require factual exploration, instead they would only 
need analysis under relevant constitutional principles.  However, a number 
of factual issues became necessary to determine the final outcome of the 
case. 
For instance, the nature of Providence as a religious entity was not self-
evident.  The agreement referred to Providence’s principles, and the articles 
of incorporation referred to the Directives, which were self-evident religious 
principles.  But, the extent to which those principles were implemented by 
Providence, or even influenced Providence in any significant way, needed 
to be established.  Providence, surprisingly, maintained that any impact of 
the Directives on its operation of the Health District’s services was de 
minimis. 
Providence was an integrated health care system, including an insurance 
plan, a number of hospitals, a number of physician groups, and a number of 
clinics and free-standing service facilities.  Providence operated in several 
states and employed well over ten thousand people.  It did not, and could 
not by federal and state law, discriminate in terms of religion in its hiring or 
its services.  Regardless of the Directives, from the perspective of a patient 
or a consumer, the service or treatment in most instances would seem the 
same as that provided by a for-profit and governmental, academic, Catholic, 
Jewish, Lutheran, Mormon, or Seventh-Day Adventist facility.  Similarly, 
from the perspective of an employee, the terms and conditions of daily labor 
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were unlikely to be limited by or conditioned upon religious observance or 
even remotely influenced by the religious mission.  An X-ray technician, a 
brain surgeon, a dietician, or a physical therapist at Providence would have 
an experience virtually indistinguishable from other institutions.154 
The significance of the religious mission of Providence was not so much 
in what it did as in what it chose not to do.  The potentially discriminatory 
impact of the religious mission on staff or patients needed to be explored.  
More importantly, it was necessary to establish whether Providence’s 
control of the Health District would mean an end to existing services or the 
preclusion of possible services, which residents could and would rightfully 
expect from their government.  
The Ad Hoc Committee’s position was that the agreement would turn 
management and governance over to a Roman Catholic institution that 
would, in turn, exclude important services that would otherwise be 
available.  It was not clear, however, what those services were or whether 
they had previously been available or whether Providence would actually 
deny them.  Obviously, the Directives expressed a restrictive view as to 
health care at the beginning of life and at the end of life, in addition to 
issues surrounding family planning, reproductive freedom, and counseling.  
Factually, it was unclear that the Health District had ever offered the 
services that the Catholic Church found repugnant such as abortion.  If these 
services did not exist under the previous scheme, arguably, nothing would 
be changed under the new agreement.  Thus, the ultimate question was the 
impact of Providence’s governance within the Health District.  Would the 
Church be running the government?  Would the government be operating 
under religious principles?  How would decision making and policy setting 
be conducted within the Health District and within Providence? 
The ways in which the agreement merged the government into 
Providence’s structure and yet kept the Health District and its taxing powers 
alive were important in two respects.  The first important aspect was that 
religion was controlling government in ways that research suggested were 
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unique.155  Another important element was that the relationship created an 
entanglement between governmental and religious institutions, forbidden by 
First Amendment case law.156  But in both of these areas, matters of degree 
were important, and those turned upon facts, and that was a matter for 
discovery. 
Another problematic area for factual development was the parties’ intent 
regarding religious principles in the delivery of health care.  Clearly, the 
parties knew that Providence was a Roman Catholic entity, but this did not 
necessarily mean that they intended to advance Roman Catholic values.  
Indeed, the publicly elected directors of the Health District might well have 
chosen Providence simply because, among an array of the other religious 
and secular institutions, Providence could provide the best health care.  
Similarly, the Providence executives, in effecting the arrangement with the 
Health District, might have intended to advance the delivery and 
distribution of health care services, as opposed to advancing the religious 
teachings of the Roman Catholic Church.  Even if the effect of the 
agreement were to establish religion or prefer a religion but the intent of the 
parties was otherwise, then arguably the challenges to the agreement would 
fail.157 
An important subsidiary issue was the role of the local bishop, as he 
would be the Catholic functionary, if any, who would implement the 
Directives.  But if he chose not to, or if Providence ignored him, then the 
Directives would be irrelevant.  The Directives were clearly national in their 
scope and application, but whether this was true of their enforcement was 
not clear.  It was also unclear who would be charged with enforcement, 
what sanctions would be employed, or which deviations would be tolerated.  
Indeed, prior to discovery, it was not even known whether agreements such 
as these required prior approval from the bishop and, if so, whether such 
approval had been obtained.158 
A final area for factual exploration surrounded the economic necessities 
and benefits of the agreement.  If the agreement was not necessary, then the 
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Health District was simply conferring a benefit upon a religious group 
without justification.  Similarly, if the benefits to the Health District from 
Providence were negligible or dubious, then there would be no public 
benefit to the Health District, but a benefit would be improperly conferred 
upon a religious entity.   
The Health District argued that it needed the agreement with Providence 
for a number of purposes such as synergies in communications, as well as 
procurement, training, delivery of services, and economies of scale.  
Conversely, the Ad Hoc Committee maintained that the needs and benefits 
were negligible and insignificant.  Such factual disputes require testimony 
on matters of constitutional facts—those considerations central to a 
constitutional concept or rule that may or may not be present in a particular 
case, or those relationships and consequences that trigger constitutional 
prohibitions or guarantees.159  What seems to be an easy application of a 
written constitution to a written agreement instead becomes a difficult 
exercise in factual advocacy.  
It is clear from this analysis that discovery had to examine three different 
sets of facts: (1) the impact that religious principles would have on services; 
(2) details of how the merged entities would operate; and (3) the economic 
merits of the agreement.  The Ad Hoc Committee had to be prepared to 
argue that the effects would be unconstitutional and that even if that were 
not so, the arrangement itself was unconstitutional.  The latter proposition 
also required factual exploration by discovery, prior to motions and 
arguments on summary judgment. 
Discovery proceeded without incident.  Production included a range of 
documents and financial statements.  Depositions were addressed to eight 
individuals, including the CEO of Providence, John Lee; the ethicist for 
Providence, Father John Tuohey; the president of the Health District’s 
board, Charles Perry; the executive director of the Health District, Michael 
Fraser; and three of the members of the Ad Hoc Committee, Corrinne 
Williams, Barbara Davidson, and Norman Johnson.  The transcripts of these 
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depositions were attached to the defendant’s motion in opposition to 
summary judgment, as well as the defendant’s cross-motion for summary 
judgment.  
The testimony at trial was largely consistent with and repetitive of the 
depositions and discovery.  The depositions were offered in the argument of 
the motions for summary judgment in support of the Ad Hoc Committee’s 
position: the Directives would control Providence, Providence would 
control the government, and the agreement was bad in both its content and 
its consequence.  
D.  Summary Judgment Proceedings 
1.  Cross-Motions   
On October 13, 2000, Providence moved for summary judgment on the 
basis that there were no genuine issues of material fact concerning the 
issues raised in the motion.160  It is worth reflecting briefly on this motion 
for summary judgment.  The effect of such a motion is to cut off a citizen’s 
right to an evidentiary hearing and right to a jury trial.  Because it bypasses 
important proceedings and terminates important rights, a motion for 
summary judgment should be cautiously approached and reluctantly 
granted.  Moreover, in order to find no material issue of fact, summary 
judgment must rest upon facts developed through the appropriate process, 
as by interrogatories or depositions.  
Rather than relying on the discovery and depositions that had raised 
important issues of fact about which the parties disagreed, the motion that 
Providence submitted relied on an affidavit of Mark May, an executive who 
had never been deposed.161  In fact, May’s affidavit had never been seen 
prior to its submission as part of Providence’s motion.  Indeed, May was 
unknown on the record until his appearance by affidavit; thus, there had 
been no cross-examination or any opportunity to rebut his claims.  May was 
the Regional Director of Physician Services; had worked for Providence 
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since 1980; and was responsible for strategic primary care development, 
clinic leadership, and affiliation with other hospitals.162  May had been the 
primary contact with respect to the Operating Agreement with the Health 
District.163  His affidavit recited that Providence owned a number of 
hospitals and that they had been recognized by various crediting agencies as 
offering excellent care.164   
The May affidavit went on to recite that a board of directors actually 
governed Providence, although the not-for-profit corporation’s sole member 
was the “Sisters of Providence-Mother Joseph Province,” whose Mother 
House is located in Montreal.165  The majority of the board members and 
the current president of Providence were not Sisters.166  (Indeed, it was 
asserted that the President was not even Catholic.)167  Of the thirteen 
thousand Providence employees in Oregon, approximately ten were Sisters, 
and May estimated that “the proportion of Providence employees who are 
Catholic is about the same as the general population.”168  His affidavit 
alleged that no bishop or other Church official “holds any position in the 
governance or management of Providence.”169  May’s affidavit further 
claimed that Providence was a Catholic health care system and recognized 
the Directives as containing “certain ethical principles that guide Catholic 
health care providers in the provision of health care services” and “certain 
restrictions on the reproductive and end-of-life health care services that may 
be performed.”170  The affidavit avowed that although Providence is 
sponsored by a religious community, “the health care services that 
Providence will provide under the terms of the Operating Agreement will 
not [be] religious in nature.”171 
May asserted that Providence was one of the largest providers of health 
care services in Oregon, offering a full range of health care services.172  The 
affidavit further stated that Providence “employs and provides health care 
services to persons of all different races, creeds, religious affiliations and 
economic means” and “has adopted a strict policy of respecting each 
person’s autonomy.”173  May also discussed Providence’s policy of focusing 
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on patients’ spiritual needs and pointed out that many of the hospital 
chaplains are not Catholic.174  May closed his affidavit by stating that as a 
provider of health care services in the Health District, Providence did not 
intend to promote any particular religious belief or practices.175  
Attached to May’s affidavit were the Operating Agreement; the Articles 
of Incorporation of the Sisters of Providence, which stated as one of its 
purposes “[t]o do any and all other things in furtherance of . . . the teachings 
and laws of the Roman Catholic Church and the Ethical and Religious 
Directives for Catholic [h]ealth [c]are [f]acilities as promulgated by the 
local bishop”;176 the Directives; and a table published by the Oregon Health 
Care Division with data that in each of the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, 
between 130 and 150 residents of Lincoln County had obtained abortions in 
Benson, Lane, Marion, Multnomah, and Washington counties.  Also 
attached were Providence Health System publications describing their core 
values as relating to the providence of God and the five core values of 
compassion, justice, respect, excellence, and stewardship. 
May subsequently filed a supplemental affidavit on October 13, 2000, to 
which the Resolutions of the Board of Directors of Pacific Communities 
Health District was attached.177  The resolution recited that because of rapid 
changes in health care services and because of an unstable financial 
environment, the Health District had solicited proposals from four health 
care systems—Providence, Samaritan, Legacy, and Peace Health.178  After 
evaluating the proposals, the board decided to proceed with Providence.179  
May’s affidavit constituted the total factual basis on which Providence 
sought summary judgment. 
In response, the Ad Hoc Committee filed a cross-motion on summary 
judgment.180  The cross-motion recited that it was supported by the 
Operating Agreement, the Directives, and the articles of incorporation, all 
of which were attached to the motion for summary judgment.181  More 
importantly, the defendant’s cross-motion was supported by the depositions 
of a number of people examined prior to trial, numbering several hundred 
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pages of sworn testimony, given in the presence of opposing counsel, 
subject to cross-examination.182  The defendant also submitted the 1998 and 
1999 Financial Statements of the Health District and its February 17, 2000, 
letter analyzing the Operating Agreement discussed above.183  The 
defendant specifically reserved issues of material fact from the request for 
summary judgment; additionally, the committee opposed the petitioner’s 
motion for summary judgment with respect to these issues: 
(b) those portions of the First Claim for Relief which turn upon 
material factual issues, as to which there is a good faith dispute for 
which testimony may be required, including allegations…as to 
future church/state entanglement and governance issues and…as to 
future impact on services, consumers and providers in the 
community, issues which may be raised by implementation of the 
Operating Agreement; (c)  those portions of the Second Claim for 
Relief concerning religious restriction of health services which turn 
upon material factual issues, as to which there is a good faith 
dispute for which testimony may be required, including allegations 
. . . as to the destructive impact throughout the [Health] District 
and . . . on future health policy and service, issues which may be 
raised by implementation of the Operating Agreement.184  
The defendant Ad Hoc Committee’s summary judgment motion recited 
that it was based on the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S 
Constitution, as well as Article I of the Oregon Constitution and the state 
statutes governing special districts such as the Pacific Communities Health 
District.185  The last paragraph of the motion specifically provided, 
In addition to the federal constitutional grounds for judgment . . . 
[the Ad Hoc Committee] seek[s] summary judgment for the further 
reason that the Operating Agreement would violate Oregon statutes 
and the Oregon Constitution…by transferring business assets 
without sufficient need or adequate compensation, by failing to 
follow proper procedure in so doing, and by adopting policies on 
health care, particularly abortion and physician-assisted death, 
contrary to state law and policy.186 
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The defendant’s motion for summary judgment specifically incorporated 
by reference the analysis and state law authority contained in a separate 
memorandum that was submitted by the amicus curiae American Civil 
Liberties Union.187 
The Ad Hoc Committee’s cross-motion on summary judgment was in 
sharp contrast to the motion submitted by Providence.  It identified and 
specifically reserved from summary judgment issues as to which material 
factual dispute existed.188  More importantly, it relied upon and specifically 
incorporated extensive factual material developed during discovery by 
production and deposition.189  The significance of this cannot be overstated.  
The Mark May affidavit supporting Providence’s motion had never been 
seen prior to its submission as a part of the motion.  This meant there had 
been no cross-examination, nor any opportunity to rebut any of his claims. 
In contrast, the Ad Hoc Committee relied on the sworn testimony of known 
individuals who had been identified by the parties, examined and cross-
examined in each other’s presence.  The nature of this evidence was clearly 
weightier than that submitted by Providence.190 
2.  Briefs and Arguments 
To defend its effort to obtain summary judgment, Providence submitted a 
brief relying on May’s affidavit and the Health District’s resolution.  The 
brief then recited that under the relevant Oregon rule, summary judgment 
was appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions on 
file show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.191  Providence 
argued that it did not violate the Oregon statute prohibiting a district from 
denying abortion192 because the hospital would not be “operated” by the 
Health District under the Operating Agreement.  Indeed, Providence would 
be operating the hospital and the Health District could permit this since its 
purpose—to assure quality health care—was secular.  The primary effect 
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would also be secular, even though the agreement would aid a church-
related entity.  
As for the constitutional test regarding entanglement as violating the 
establishment clause,193 Providence argued that the entanglement must be 
with religion, not simply with a religiously connected entity, in order to 
constitute a violation.194  Providence argued further that even if certain 
forms of health care were lost, there was no right to have abortions offered 
by the Health District or its hospitals.195  In any event, the loss of certain 
health care benefits would not be the result of discrimination against any 
religious group or a penalty for the exercise of religion. 
The Ad Hoc Committee of citizens submitted a fifty-six page 
memorandum on summary judgment, arguing that this case was distinctive 
because the government was enabling a private, religious entity to take over 
not only a governmental function, but also a governmental entity.196  In that 
sense, it resembled the facts involved in the United States Supreme Court 
cases Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village v. Grumet197 and Larkin v. 
Grendel’s Den.198  Moreover, because the Health District retained its 
identity as part of the agreement with Providence, it would be adopting 
religious symbols and endorsing religious teachings through the changes in 
its name and logo and through its endorsement of the Directives.  Here, the 
Ad Hoc Committee was relying on Santa Fe Independent School District v. 
Doe and Lee v. Weisman.199 
The Ad Hoc Committee drew attention to the arguments about 
government control and symbolism: the agreement meant the Health 
District was endorsing the Directives—an endorsement of great symbolic 
significance quite apart from the practical consequences of the agreement 
itself—which limited services that might be available in the community.  
Thus, the effect of the merger on health care services was not controlling or 
dispositive; it was simply impermissible for a religiously grounded entity to 
control the government, or for the government to endorse or to adopt 
religious symbols or teachings.  Just as a state supreme court could not post 
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the Ten Commandments in its entryway,200 so the Health District could not 
endorse, adopt, or enforce the Directives. 
The citizens also argued that the agreement with Providence 
impermissibly entangled the affairs and operations of government with 
religion and favored one religion over another.201  The Ad Hoc Committee 
argued that the Health District would have to monitor Providence’s services 
and quality, which would entangle it with Providence.202  Additionally, the 
Health District had turned over a number of important functions, including 
taxing authority and its earning revenue;203 the Operating Agreement 
provided that the Health District was subject to the missions, policies, and 
values of Providence, which would include the religious Directives.204  All 
of this created an excessive entanglement under relevant U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions as per the Lemon v. Kurtzman test.205 
Apart from the entanglement argument, the Ad Hoc Committee also 
claimed that the government wrongly favored one religion by transferring 
the assets, cash flow, and patient base to Providence.206  In particular, the 
committee emphasized that the transfer of the Health District’s operations 
included its employees, who would have to accept a contract imposing the 
Directives on their health care services if they wished to remain 
employed.207  The committee relied on the U.S. Supreme Court cases Abood 
v. Detroit Board of Education208 and Keller v. State Bar of California209 for 
the proposition that forcing the Health District employees to accept these 
types of changes violated the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  The Ad Hoc Committee also argued that the agreement 
violated Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits a religious test 
for any office or public trust in the U.S. government.210 
Finally, the committee argued that the proposed agreement between the 
Health District and Providence burdened their due process rights to health 
care services both at the beginning and at the end of life.211  They argued 
that the proposed arrangement with Providence would violate state laws that 
create an entitlement to health care, as well as federal law, which allowed 
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both the right to die and the right to an abortion.212  The Ad Hoc Committee 
relied on Roe v. Wade213 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey214 to support 
these arguments.  Furthermore, the necessity for the merger agreement and 
the Health District’s financial condition became relevant, because a burden 
on Fourteenth Amendment rights only becomes “undue” if it is 
unreasonable.215  The Health District tried to justify the arrangement with 
Providence as reasonable because it was financially necessary.  The citizens 
contended, however, that the Health District was actually in excellent 
economic condition and that the arrangement required so little of 
Providence that, economically, the arrangement was unjustifiable.  
The Health District and Providence both filed responsive motions and 
briefs.216  Providence’s reply brief began by observing that it was “up to the 
voters, and the voters alone, to decide whether to have a hospital district in 
the first place.”217  The argument went on to state that “[t]he statutes don’t 
require a district to provide any medical services at all . . . [but] the statutes 
allow a district to provide practically any medical services the people 
want—and are willing to pay for.”218   
Providence’s reply brief then turned to the arguments about religion.  
Providence maintained that it was not helpful to speak of “a threatened 
“merger”“ because there would be none.219  Rather, “both sides will retain 
their identity.”220  Also the governance of the Health District would not be 
transferred and replaced by the court’s “religious governance” of 
Providence, because the Health District’s board would still “make law for 
the District.”221  Providence would not acquire any control over the board of 
directors.222  Providence went on to argue as follows:  “The opposition 
briefs betray deep confusion as to what is government and what is not.  The 
Health District’s hospital is not government.  The hospital is property.  It is 
a facility. . . .”223  The reply brief also contended that the Ad Hoc 
Committee engaged in “inflammatory rhetoric” when it suggested that the 
merger agreement would transfer a solvent, valuable system of health care 
with no return consideration.224  Providence then quoted from an affidavit 
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by the Health District hospital’s chief administrator, stating that it had been 
operating at a loss to prove that the Health District was not solvent.225  
Providence took issue with the cases cited by the committee and argued that 
it relied on cases in which two entities “often in difficult straits, have 
employed government to aid them with money, supplies, zoning restrictions 
and the like. . . . Providence did not initiate this transaction . . . . Providence 
did not seek out the [Health] District for assistance, let alone assist in 
pursuing any religious activity.  It was rather the [Health] District that 
sought help.”226  
Providence reiterated its argument that religious purpose was missing in 
the merger agreement.227  It distinguished the committee’s reliance on 
Kiryas Joel and Grendel’s Den by contending these were cases in which 
religious criteria had been explicitly employed.228  As to entanglement 
under Lemon v. Kurtzman, Providence cited its earlier argument that the 
entanglement has to be in the religious activity of Providence, rather than in 
the general activities of a religious entity.229  Providence further argued that 
it would operate the hospital and “then operation of the hospital by the 
[Health] District necessarily ceases.”230  Providence also contended that 
“[t]he Directives may then have some effect on Providence’s operation of 
the hospital, but [it] can’t and won’t have any effect on anything that the 
[Health] District does, because the [Health] District will not be involved in 
the operation.”231  Therefore, Providence argued, the Health District would 
not be entangled with the Directives.232 
As to the issues of reproductive services and end-of-life services under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, Providence argued that the Health District and 
Providence were not constitutionally obligated to offer all forms of health 
care.233  The fact that there might be a constitutional right to specific forms 
of health care did not mean that the Health District or any governmental 
unit must offer that health care.  
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3.  Court Ruling 
On November 22, 2000, the trial judge ruled on the motions for summary 
judgment.234  After a lengthy review of the pleadings and the arguments,235 
the judge first ruled that the Operating Agreement would not violate 
Oregon’s abortion statutes and then turned to the state constitutional law 
claims stating, “It is my judgment that the question of whether this court 
should follow the Oregon Constitution in analyzing the [Operating 
Agreement] is one of the most important aspects of this case.”236  He 
concluded that under the Oregon statutes, if funds went to a religious 
organization as opposed to a religious function, this meant that the Oregon 
Constitution had not been violated.237  He therefore held that evidence 
should be taken on that question.  As to the Directives, the judge agreed 
with Providence; similar to other private organizations that might provide 
the same health care services as Providence, any benefits flowing to 
Providence from the Health District would be used for providing health care 
services and not for proselytizing.238  Still, the judge stated that he believed 
evidence must be taken to answer the questions of whether under the 
Oregon Constitution money would be paid to a religious or theological 
institution and whether that money will be “paid for the benefit of” that 
institution.239 
Turning to the U.S. Constitution and the First Amendment, the judge held 
that the purpose behind the Operating Agreement was secular and that its 
primary effect was one that neither advanced nor inhibited religion.240  
However, he also stated that “the court should hear evidence as to how, why 
and whether the [Operating Agreement], during its implementation, would 
‘foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”241  As to 
these issues, the court denied summary judgment, and it held that evidence 
would be taken at trial.242  As to free exercise under the First Amendment, 
the judge could find nothing in the record to support a violation, but also 
remarked, “even so, discretion causes me to opt in favor of taking evidence 
on the subject.”243  
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The judge then turned to the Fourteenth Amendment issues concerning a 
right to health care services at the beginning and at the end of life as a 
matter of due process.244  The committee’s argument had been that the 
Operating Agreement, by implementing the Directives, would restrict 
services offered now or in the future.  Moreover, the merger agreement’s 
restrictions were unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional, because the 
restrictions were not financially justifiable.  The court simply ruled against 
these claims, granting summary judgment on the ground that “there is no 
federal constitutional obligation that a public hospital provide ‘reproductive 
health care and that the failure to do so does not violate the equal protection 
or due process clauses.’”245  He added that it was the judgment of the court 
that “this hospital, operated by the [Health] District or by Providence, has 
the ability to provide that same service to the [Health] District residents but 
is not required to do so.”246   
The court then outlined the issues for trial. First, under the authority of 
the Oregon Constitution, the court thought that there was a genuine issue of 
material fact on the following questions: (i) whether the funding to 
Providence directed by the Operating Agreement “benefits” Providence as a 
religious institution; and (ii) whether the Operating Agreement, in 
operation, avoids excessive government entanglement with religion.247  
Second, under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the court 
believed there was a genuine issue of material fact as to (i) whether the 
Operating Agreement, in operation, avoids excessive government 
entanglement with religion; and (ii) whether the hospital, post-Operating 
Agreement, is going to be operating as a “pervasively religious 
institution.”248  Finally, as to the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution, the court determined the following: (i) the Operating 
Agreement does not cause the impairment or loss of rights that otherwise 
existed prior to its execution; (ii) there is no federal constitutional obligation 
that a public hospital provide reproductive health care, and the failure to do 
so does not violate either the equal protection or due process clauses of the 
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Fourteenth Amendment; and (iii) if it is determined at some future date that 
the court’s ruling on this subject is incorrect, the court notes that 
Providence, a private institution, will be operating the hospital and is 
therefore not subject to the Fourteenth Amendment.249 
It is not necessary to provide a thorough critique of the decision on 
summary judgment because the case proceeded fully to trial; however, a 
few points should be noted.  The ruling on the First Amendment simply 
ignores the establishment issues raised by the enormous, unnecessary 
transfer of assets to Providence.  Also, the requirement that the Ad Hoc 
Committee must prove the hospital would be “pervasively religious” is 
nowhere supported in case law.250  
As to the Fourteenth Amendment, the judge’s finding that there was no 
loss of rights was simply impossible to conclude without testimony, and the 
finding that there is no right to reproductive health care ignores the 
argument that such health care cannot be denied for religious reasons.  As 
for the conclusion that Providence is “private” and the hospital would not 
be subject to the Fourteenth Amendment (i.e., no “state action”), the judge’s 
ruling seems to fly in the face of the Operating Agreement’s terms,251 which 
provided that Providence would operate not only the hospital but also the 
Health District.  Thus, the necessary state action is present in the 
governmental ownership and authority taken over and operated by 
Providence.  The decision is also inconsistent: if there was state action for 
the purpose of the First Amendment, then there would be also be state 
action for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.252 
V.  TRIAL AND DECISION 
A.  Trial Testimony 
1.  Plaintiffs 
The litigation between the Health District and the Ad Hoc Committee 
went to trial in November of 2000.253  During a week and a half of trial, the 
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parties called as witnesses many of those who had previously been deposed.  
The Health District’s witnesses included John Lee, CEO of Providence; 
Michael Fraser, CEO of the Health District; Doctors Long and Cely, 
president of the Health District’s board and a staff practitioner, respectively; 
and Father John Tuohey, a Roman Catholic priest and staff ethicist for 
Providence.254  Additional witnesses for the plaintiffs were Dr. Albert Starr, 
a noted heart specialist, and Mary Jo Tully, the chancellor for the 
archdiocese of Portland.255   
Although the CEO of Providence, John Lee, testified at great length, his 
testimony was essentially an overview of Providence’s operations.  
Furthermore, he deferred to other witnesses for the details concerning the 
impact of the Directives on services within the Health District, as well as 
how the mechanics and management of the merger would be affected.  
However, Lee was clear that the Directives were a part of Providence’s 
articles of incorporation and a continuing part of Providence’s commitment 
to the healing ministry of Jesus.256  He also stated that the ministry and the 
Directives are a constant source of reference for all of Providence’s 
operations and personnel.257  Finally, he testified that the tax revenues from 
the Health District were essential to making the arrangement economically 
feasible.258 
Dr. Cely testified that he presently does tubal ligations at the Health 
District’s Newport hospital subject only to medical justifications, and that 
he provides information for patients seeking abortions, vasectomies, or 
contraceptives.259  Tubal ligations are done at the hospital and are 
commonly sought after labor and delivery.260  He knew nothing about the 
Catholic Directives.261  In addition, he cited no hospital policies banning 
abortion, family planning, or physician-assisted suicide.262  Dr. Long, who 
had been extensively involved in negotiating the agreement with 
Providence, was similarly uninformed about the Directives, although he did 
testify they were a continuing source of concern.263  He also confirmed Dr. 
Cely’s testimony about existing policies at the Health District facilities.264  
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Warranting somewhat greater summary was the testimony of Mary Jo 
Tully, the chancellor of the archdiocese of Portland.  She testified that the 
Directives are reviewed by the Vatican and are a part of health care that 
must be complied with.265  The archdiocese would not allow contraception 
and tubal ligation.266  If the archbishop does not approve a hospital’s 
medical practices, he can ultimately declare that the hospital is not 
Catholic.267  Even so, Tully went on to testify that the bishop will not insert 
himself into the physician-patient relationship and has no jurisdiction over 
the governance or operation of Providence.268  In fact, the bishop had not 
been consulted on the contract between the Health District and 
Providence.269 
Michael Fraser’s testimony was somewhat more detailed as to the 
agreement and operations.  Fraser, the CEO of the Health District, described 
the clinics and the hospital as providing mostly primary care.270  In the 
process of deciding whether to affiliate the Health District with Providence, 
he testified that there were extensive committees and meetings, followed by 
an extensive selection-and-screening process.271  Bids were solicited only 
from nonprofit hospitals—Providence, Legacy, Peace Health, and 
Samaritan—that were all religiously affiliated.272  These hospitals are all 
sizable, good health care providers.  No bid was deemed unacceptable, and 
Samaritan had recently begun an affiliation with North Lincoln Hospital 
nearby.273  Fraser also testified that the Directives would apply to all 
physicians having medical staff privileges at the hospital or renting space in 
the newly proposed medical office building.274  Furthermore, the Directives 
would prohibit abortion and referrals for abortion even if the pregnancy 
resulted from rape.275  They would also prohibit physician-assisted 
suicide.276  However, he also testified there would be no interference 
between physician and patient, because the Directives are not “a rule 
book.”277  
Fraser’s testimony was crucial on several points: there was no compelling 
economic need for the merger, policy and practice would in fact change, 
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and governance would pass from the Health District to Providence.  Equally 
important, the Roman Catholic symbols would be affixed to the Health 
District’s buildings and stationery.278  His testimony also revealed that 
Fraser himself would be the new CEO of the Health District subunit of 
Providence.279  
The testimony of Father Tuohey was also of vital importance.  While 
Chancellor Tully had testified from the perspective of the archbishop, who 
knew nothing of the proposed merger, Father Tuohey could testify from 
Providence’s perspective.  He was well informed about the Directives and 
their impact on the mission and operations of the District post-merger.280  
Father Tuohey’s testimony may be summarized as follows:281 
As a priest/ethicist, [Tuohey] consults on cases under the Religious 
Directives at Providence.  “The Healing Ministry of Jesus” is an 
essential part of Providence’s mission as described in the 
Introduction to the Religious Directives.  The Religious Directives 
bar tubal ligations, but due to medical objections, and would not 
permit vasectomies at Providence or in District facilities.  A 
physician could refer a patient for assisted suicide, but not write 
the prescription.  “[M]orning after” pills282 and abortions are 
prohibited. 
The Religious Directives will govern the [Health] District under 
the Operating Agreement and [apply] to physicians on Medical 
Staff, and to all professionals and patients and all employees. 
The Directives would not be enforced on a physician, however.  
There is no “snooping.”  [The Directives] are very much like ethics 
text of Beauchamp and Childress,283 although those are not 
“directives” or based on God. 
The Directives are implemented by Bishops to promote 
consistency of Roman Catholic Theology.  [They] are meeting now 
to revise the Directives.  [T]his Agreement does not require the 
Bishop’s approval because it is not a partnership—it is a complete 
takeover,284 but the Bishop does know about it. 
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The Providence logo and sign have a “corporate cross” with 
shading.  [T]he cross is the most powerful symbol in Christianity; 
it represents in history and theology, Christ’s suffering and its 
meaning.  [I]t is a central symbol; in churches, in nave, with 
stations of the cross, on rosary beads.285 
This testimony by Father Tuohey was highly significant because it drew 
from his status as a priest and a corporate ethicist.  He made it clear that the 
Directives would impact the Health District and its services directly and 
pervasively.286  The statement that Providence would not, and does not, 
“snoop” tends to negate that.  But actually, it suggests a very different 
reality.  Providence was inconsistent in its enforcement of the Directives 
and hypocritical by declaring values while debasing them; this 
inconsistency was the very danger the National Conference of Catholic 
Bishops feared.  Virginia Terhaar, a counseling practitioner and a witness 
for the Ad Hoc Committee, testified that the resulting ethical dilemma, 
along with the basic question of whether she could counsel about abortion 
or birth control when dealing with victims of rape, led her to withdraw from 
Providence’s referral list of counselors.287  
2.  Defense 
The Ad Hoc Committee’s witnesses included four of its members, each 
of whom had health care expertise.  Clearly, their opposition was not solely 
ideological.  One witness had owned and operated health care facilities 
(Norman Johnson); another had set up birth control programs for the state 
of Oregon (Barbara Davidson); another had been director of the County 
Health Department (Hilda Moravick); and yet another had administered 
health care programs for the poor (Claudia Webster).288  To add to that, 
three witnesses had served on the board of the Health District.289  Each 
witness was able to testify to the importance of the health care services that 
might be lost if the merger were implemented.290   
The testimony of Lois Backus, executive director of Planned Parenthood 
of the Columbia-Willamette region, was significant.  She gave a state-wide 
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perspective on the availability of family planning and reproductive services, 
the importance of those services, and the impact of Roman Catholic 
institutions on the distribution of such services.291 
Another witness testified about loss of services at the end of life.  George 
Eighmey, Executive Director of Compassion in Dying in Oregon and a 
former legislator, testified about the importance of the Oregon Death with 
Dignity Act292 and the adamant opposition of the Catholic Church, and 
Providence in particular, to the Act’s drafting, adoption, and 
implementation.293  From his work counseling dying patients, Eighmey 
testified in support of the need for death-support services and the scarcity of 
those services.294  In his opinion, the merger agreement would have a 
seriously negative impact within the Health District on end-of-life 
services.295 
Two expert witnesses commented on the nature of Catholic teaching and 
corporate culture, tracking the axes of the issues in the case.  The first 
expert witness was Father Golenski, a former Jesuit priest, who is now a 
national health care and bioethics consultant and a member of several 
national panels and works with several national health care providers.296  
His testimony can be summarized as follows:297 
The Religious Directives are due to the Bishops Conference 
concern for partnerships of Catholic Hospitals and non-Catholic 
hospitals, like this one—a Bishop’s objection would be very 
powerful, [and] must give a nihil obstat [before a merger may 
proceed.]  [T]he application is clear to the Bishops, but may not be 
to the hospital.  [I]f the District offers prohibited services, there 
would be a problem when [the Bishop] learns there are instances 
where Bishops have interfered. 
Contrary to [Father] Tuohey[‘s testimony], [the] Religious 
Directives do apply to the Operating Agreement between 
Providence and the [Health] District. 
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[The Religious Directives] are under revision presently.  They have 
been reviewed by the Vatican’s Holy Office and will be reviewed 
by the Pope. 
The Religious Directives prohibit abortion, tubal ligations, and 
morning after pill[s under] a mandate from the Vatican.  
[P]hysician-assisted suicide would be “prohibited entirely.”  [The] 
Religious Directives are not consistent with Oregon policy on 
physician-assisted suicide or family planning with the Oregon 
Health Plan. 
The actual effect may turn on interpretation by a hospital, and the 
Operating Agreement is silent on that; but a physician performing a 
prohibited service would still be violating the Directives.  They 
don’t have thought police . . . . 
Although religious, Providence gets Medicare funding,298 but not 
for religious services.299   
Father Golenski’s testimony was thus an effective counterpoint to the 
testimony of Father Tuohey, and it was followed by the testimony of 
Merwyn Greenlick.  Greenlick, who holds a Ph.D. in medical care 
organizations, is a former vice president of research for the Kaiser 
Foundation Health Plan and chair of the department of public health at 
Oregon Health Sciences University.300  His specialty is corporate culture 
and decision making.301  An important issue in the case was the extent to 
which a set of values, such as the Directives, could permeate and motivate a 
large corporation.  Professor Greenlick testified that “Providence Health 
System is extensively, distinctly, palpably religious and Catholic.  Its 
message, through symbols [and] prayers, to consultant and patient is 
clear.”302  
The selective nature of the summary above is partly to illustrate the 
necessity for testimony to develop constitutional arguments.  Theoretical 
abstractions, even when complex, are still relatively easy to state.  However, 
as noted earlier, proving their application in context is frequently very 
difficult.  It requires putting witnesses on the stand who could, with 
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expertise and competence, testify that religious principles actually motivate 
corporations; that services would in fact be lost and that those services are, 
in fact, important; that governmental functions would become entangled 
with religious practices; and that the government would begin adopting 
religious symbols.  The testimony as to these and other “constitutional 
facts” must be concrete, relating directly to the context and litigants before 
the court, yet also address a state of affairs not yet in being.   
At some level, all of this becomes a matter, not of theory, but of logistics.  
To prove these propositions requires finding witnesses; persuading them to 
appear; scheduling around their schedules and the court’s overburdened, 
inadequate schedule; carefully phrasing questions that will survive 
objection; and drawing answers that avoid mere speculation.  These are 
problems in any kind of litigation, but they are more urgent and crucial in 
pro bono litigation.  Pro bono witnesses must frequently be persuaded to 
testify without compensation; indeed, they often must bear their own 
expense of getting to and from a remote location, perhaps losing a day of 
work, to testify.303  The logistical burden for corporate litigants is far less. 
They not only have substantial budgets to pay attorneys and to reimburse 
their experts, but frequently their witnesses are paid employees, and so their 
testimony and travel are part of their jobs.  
For public interest litigants, the imbalance of resources and power is 
frequently daunting and too plain to ignore.304  One way of correcting the 
inequality is by drawing on public advocacy groups such as Planned 
Parenthood, the National Organization for Women, and the American Civil 
Liberties Union to intervene as litigants or amicus curiae, and to provide 
support and attorneys.  For reasons never made clear, all but the American 
Civil Liberties Union declined to do so in the Newport case.305 
But in the end, as with much of public interest litigation, the resources for 
the public litigant must be those that he or she brings personally to the 
cause.  In Newport, the ten members of the Ad Hoc Committee were 
exceptionally experienced and articulate professionals.  They possessed the 
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experience and training necessary to be persuasive witnesses.  And, beyond 
this, they possessed the credentials to qualify as expert witnesses.  The 
experience, commitment, and tenacity of each, including those who did not 
testify, made it clear from the very outset that the Newport trial would be a 
fair fight. 
B.  Arguments and Briefs at Trial 
The court instructed the parties on the close of testimony to submit 
briefs.306  The briefs of both Providence and the Health District were 
submitted as instructed.  The brief of the Ad Hoc Committee was completed 
but never submitted because two days prior to the submission date, January 
17, 2001, the attorneys for Providence and the Health District announced 
that Providence was exercising its option under the agreement to withdraw 
from the merger; their view was that the case was moot.307  Subsequently, 
the judge instructed counsel to “lay their pencils down.” 
The briefs of Providence and the Health District reiterated the parties’ 
views on summary judgment; these briefs may be obtained from and are on 
file with the court.  Given the judge’s ruling on summary judgment and the 
fact that the Ad Hoc Committee’s brief was never filed, it would be 
worthwhile to make the committee’s brief available.308  The brief illustrates 
the ways in which the testimony was woven into and supported the 
constitutional theory advanced by the Ad Hoc Committee.   
The trial brief for the Ad Hoc Committee of citizens focused on the 
following arguments: (1) Providence, as a religious institution, was 
engaging in state action;309 (2) the Operating Agreement involved religious 
discrimination;310 (3) the unconstitutional entanglement of government and 
religion was accomplished through the delegation of governmental 
authority and public assets to Providence, which dictated services and 
policies through religious principles;311 (4) Providence’s policies and the 
Directives dictated a loss of certain services;312 and (5) Oregon law 
mandated comprehensive health care throughout life and Providence’s 
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policies limited services, particularly care for the beginning and ending of 
life.313  
The record and the brief were sufficient to pose important issues for 
decision by the trial judge and the appellate courts, in the event of an 
appeal.  Neither, however, was to happen.  
VI.  DISPOSITION AND ATTORNEY’S FEES 
A.  Hearing on Dismissal 
Providence decided to exercise its option under the Operating Agreement 
to withdraw from the merger.314  The reasons for withdrawal were never 
fully expressed.  It seems clear that the contracting parties were not 
anticipating the depth of opposition posed by the Ad Hoc Committee or the 
delay in consummation posed by the court proceeding.  It may also be that 
the expense of maintaining the litigation (over $450,000 for the Health 
District’s attorneys’ fees,315 and likely an equal amount for Providence) was 
not anticipated and thus chilled the ardor of the parties. 
In May of 2001, the trial judge entered a judgment of dismissal without 
prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The dismissal “without 
prejudice” was troublesome, because it meant that the Health District and 
Providence could potentially fashion another agreement or simply refile the 
validation proceeding that had initiated the litigation.  Providence’s 
withdrawal and motion to dismiss316 merely required that the agreement 
submitted to the court would not be undertaken or enforced.  
Nonetheless, the dismissal represented a victory for the citizens who had 
opposed the proposed merger.  The adamant opposition within the 
community made it unlikely that the Health District and Providence would 
initiate further steps toward a merger.  And, perhaps, just possibly, the 
parties were persuaded to reconsider the constitutional validity of the 
merger. 
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B.  Attorney’s Fees 
Attorney fees in public interest litigation assume great importance as they 
are essential to the assertion of constitutional rights, and they are a 
disincentive to those who deny rights.  The application for attorney’s fees in 
this case was principally based upon 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988.317  Relief 
under these provisions is available when a party prevails on a counterclaim 
for which the law allows recovery of attorney fees.318  If a lawsuit produces 
a voluntary action by the defendant that affords the plaintiff some or all of 
the relief requested, the plaintiff prevails.319  In this case, if the committee’s 
claims were a catalyst in the decision of Providence to withdraw from the 
agreement, which in turn resulted in the dismissal of these proceedings, the 
committee would qualify as a prevailing party and, thus, be entitled to 
attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  To be a catalyst, there must be (1) 
a causal link between the lawsuit and the relief awarded, and (2) a legal 
basis for the plaintiffs’ claim.320  It appeared that the committee clearly met 
the two-prong test.   
The argument and the catalyst theory, however, were short lived, and the 
timing of the application for attorney’s fees was ill fated.  The application 
was filed on June 7, 2001.321  Six days later, the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West Virginia Department of 
Health and Human Resources.322  The Supreme Court rejected the catalyst 
theory in Buckhannon as follows:  
A defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps 
accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, 
lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change.  Our 
precedents thus counsel against holding that the term ‘prevailing 
party’ authorizes an award of attorney’s fees. 323   
After Buckhannon, it was clear that a “prevailing party” is only one who 
has been awarded some relief by the court, even if it is a consent decree or 
judicially entered settlement. 
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The denial of attorney fees in the Newport case and in Buckhannon is bad 
policy.  Attorney fee awards are an essential aspect of asserting the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments in civil rights cases.  They are the financing 
mechanism for leveling the playing fields of justice.  That did not happen in 
Newport.  Counsel for the Health District and Providence received a 
considerable amount in fees, far greater than the amount requested by 
Counsel for the Ad Hoc Committee, for filing litigation that ultimately did 
not benefit their clients.  Counsel for the Ad Hoc Committee submitted a 
statement for 600 billable hours ($180,000 at $300 per hour) and received 
nothing; no appeal was taken. 
The dissenters in Buckhannon got it right: if a litigant may avoid defeat 
by simply desisting, possibly to resume at a later time, attorney fees will 
rarely be awarded, and a crucial incentive for bringing suit to protect civil 
rights will be lost.  Worse, if the wrongdoer may initiate a suit, wear down 
any opponents, and then walk away as they did in the Newport case, there is 
even less of an incentive to appear in defense of constitutional rights or to 
seek their protection.324 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Mergers are the preferred mode of growth in the health care field and are 
often necessary for health care organizations to survive.  Governmental 
providers are designed to meet needs in small, rural communities and often 
have difficulty surviving.  Catholic health systems, however, are among the 
largest in the nation and quite naturally seek to acquire smaller 
governmental providers.  It is likely, therefore, that the issues raised in the 
Newport litigation will recur. 
The economics of the agreement were clear: Providence needed the 
taxing income of the Health District for the proposed merger to function.  
Consequently, Providence kept the Health District in a functioning state, but 
as an extension of Providence.  The government unit was essentially kept 
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intact and was run by a religious entity.  This arrangement violated the First 
Amendment. 
It was this point that was crucial to the litigation.  Providence argued that, 
as a private party, it was not subject to the First Amendment’s prohibitions; 
its services did not involve “state action.”  Moreover, Providence argued 
that it was not “pervasively religious.”  But the nature of the arrangement 
with the Health District was that the Health District would be implementing 
religious policies, the Ethical and Religious Directives on Health Care.  
Moreover, Providence would be absorbing much of the Health District’s 
governance into its structure, exercising governmental powers and authority 
pursuant to religious principles.  This infusion of assets and authority 
amounted to establishing religion and creating entanglements even if 
services remained unaffected. 
Future mergers would benefit from avoiding these features of the 
Newport arrangement.  Two extremes could serve as safe harbors: either a 
simple management agreement or a total sale and merger.  Either would 
have avoided the witches brew of government and religion that was so 
objectionable in Newport.  A third possibility is the creation of a third 
corporation to manage the public facility, free of the Directives.  
The Newport litigation unearthed a surprising reality and tension 
surrounding the place of religion under the First Amendment.  Within this 
tension, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops has profound 
concerns about the American Catholic health care establishment; they fear 
that the pressures of the marketplace will cause Catholic hospitals to 
compromise Catholic principles and engage in “scandal.”325  The testimony 
in Newport substantiates these fears.  The bishops intend the Directives to 
restrict and to direct the activities of Catholic health care throughout the 
United States.  But Roman Catholic health care constitutes a multibillion 
dollar enterprise annually, with its own needs and agenda.  The tension 
between these two Catholic institutions, health care and the Church, is 
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palpable.  Indeed, this tension is precisely what the First Amendment is all 
about. 
Over the last forty years, with the advent of Medicare and Medicaid, the 
national health care budget has become largely publicly funded.  Over four 
hundred million dollars annually is provided through Medicare and 
Medicaid—that is through the government to private health care 
providers.326  The line between private and public is thereby blurred, as the 
government seeks to manage health care and contain cost, as well as 
seeking to encourage health care policy in areas like family planning.  First 
Amendment concerns are inevitably implicated when the recipients of those 
federal dollars are Catholic institutions.  At the same time, religious 
concerns are raised for those who seek to protect the Church and its 
ministry from the temptations of public funding. 
Paradoxically, the bishops and the Ad Hoc Committee shared a common 
concern about the entry of Catholic institutions into the delivery of health 
care.  From radically different starting points and perspectives, each was 
concerned about the compromise of principle resulting from the merger of 
government and religion.  For both the bishops and the Ad Hoc Committee, 
a wall of separation is needed.  For each, the problem posed was when 
government and religion are dependent on each other, how shall we render 
unto Caesar what is Caesar’s and yet render unto God what is God’s?327 
                                                 
1 Arthur B. LaFrance is Professor of Law at Lewis & Clark Law School. 
2 The author served as counsel pro bono for the Ad Hoc Committee of the Newport 
residents opposing the proposed merger.  He wishes to express his appreciation and 
admiration for the Committee members who undertook considerable personal risk in 
challenging a major industry in their small town and experienced substantial anxiety as 
the politics of this litigation unfolded.  They stayed the course with courage and grace.  
The author also wishes to express his gratitude to Dean James Huffman of Lewis & Clark 
Law School, for providing research grants, assistants, and administrative support, which 
made it possible for a faculty member to undertake major litigation on a pro bono basis.  
Extensive research, secretarial assistance, and photocopying were indispensable to 
representing the clients in this case.  Such an institutional commitment can be justified on 
a number of bases—community service, professional enhancement, and teaching 
enrichment—but it takes an unusual dean to appreciate this. 
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3 For consistency, we have used health care throughout this article as the preferred 
spelling of THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 
2000), including instances where healthcare originally appeared in excerpts. 
4 Mergers between hospitals, insurers, and other providers, such as pharmaceutical 
firms, have become commonplace.  What is not as obvious is the volume of mergers 
involving church-related providers.  The following is a brief list of scholarship worth 
reviewing: COHEN & MORRISON, NATIONAL WOMEN’S LAW CENTER, HOSPITAL 
MERGERS AND THE THREAT TO WOMEN’S REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES (2001); 
Donald H.J. Hermann, Religious Identity and The Health Care Market: Mergers and 
Acquisitions Involving Religiously Affiliated Providers, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV. 927 
(2001); William W. Bassett, Private Religious Hospitals: Limitations upon Autonomous 
Moral Choices in Reproductive Medicine, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 455 
(2001); Monica Sloboda, The High Cost of Merging with a Religiously-Controlled 
Hospital, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 140 (2001); Lawrence E. Singer & Elizabeth 
Johnson Lantz, The Coming Millenium: Enduring Issues Confronting Catholic Health 
Care, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 299 (1999); Hollie J. Paine, The Catholic Merger Crusade, 2 
J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 371 (1999); Jane Hochberg, The Sacred Heart Story: 
Hospital Mergers and Their Effects on Reproductive Rights, 75 OR. L. REV. 945 (1996); 
Lisa C. Ikemoto, When A Hospital Becomes Catholic, 47 MERCER L. REV. 1087 (1996); 
Kathleen M. Boozang, Deciding the Fate of Religious Hospitals in the Emerging Health 
Care Market, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 1429 (1995); Lawrence E. Singer, Realigning Catholic 
Health Care: Bridging Legal and Church Control in a Consolidating Market, 72 TUL. L. 
REV. 159 (1997). 
5 Each entity has a Web site that may be visited for much of the factual descriptions 
which follow.  The Web site for Pacific Communities Health District is 
http://www.samhealth.org (last visited Nov. 15, 2004).  The Web site for Providence 
Health Systems is http://www.providence.org/home (last visited Nov. 15, 2004.  Note 
that subsequent to the litigation described in this article, Pacific Communities Health 
District affiliated as a “partner” with Samaritan Health System, which had, while the 
litigation was pending, worked out a similar arrangement with North Lincoln Hospital, 
some twenty-five miles away. 
6 The Health District is a special-function governmental unit, like a school, water, or fire 
district, with an array of governmental functions and powers, including taxation. 
7 COMMITTEE ON DOCTRINE, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, 
ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES (4th ed. 
2001), at http://www.usccb.org/bishops/directives.shtml (last visited Nov. 15, 2004) 
[hereinafter DIRECTIVES].  The seventy-two Directives and their extensive commentary 
are a product of the bishops’ concern for the conduct of American Catholic health care 
institutions and target affiliations with proposed mergers. 
8 The Ad Hoc Committee’s position was that Providence was religious, and even if it 
was not, the agreement enshrined the Directives, thereby entangling the government in 
religious doctrines and institutions. 
9 In most legal scholarship, text content is footnoted to sources and authorities publicly 
available in libraries for hard copy or electronic retrieval.  The Newport case and this 
article are not subject to such conventional citation given the outcome of the litigation.  
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However, a reader who would like to see actual filings or transcripts may do so by 
contacting the Court Administrator, Nancy Lamvik (as of 2004), for Lincoln County 
Circuit Court, P.O. Box 100, 225 W. Olive St., Room 202, Newport, Oregon, 97365.  The 
case reference is In the Matter of the Petition of Gary Hoagland, Charles L. Perry, Frank 
Armstrong, Carol A. Waters and Doctor David Long, as the Board of Pacific 
Communities Health District, No. 00-1227.  The court reporter’s notes are retained by the 
administrator’s office and transcripts are available at $2.50 per page.  Facsimiles of court 
papers may similarly be obtained through the administrator’s office. 
10 A preferential treatment of religion would simply look at the transfers to Providence 
and argue they are not supported by a quid pro quo analysis.  The establishment argument 
asserts that the agreement has government supporting religion and being managed by it. 
11 If it were argued that the agreement created a preference for one religion over other 
religions, the opponents would possibly have been required to show intent on the part of 
the Health District board to favor one religion. 
12 Providence Health System, Our Mission, 
 http://www.providence.org/phs/about_Providence/default.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 
2004). 
13 Trial Transcript, Testimony of Father John Francis Tuohey, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 
00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (“[E]thical norms that could only be enforced 
by snooping probably ought not to be enforced.”) (on file with the author) [hereinafter 
Testimony of Tuohey].   See also infra Part V.A.  It was confirmed, in part, by testimony 
of the Health District’s professionals that they were unaware of the Directives and 
believed their practices after the merger would continue as they were before.  Id. 
14 The problem posed is commonplace in civil litigation on applications for preliminary 
injunctions seeking to avoid future harm.  But in those cases, however, there is usually a 
past record of abuse or misconduct to which the parties can refer.  In the Newport case, 
such a foundation was far more difficult to establish. 
15 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).  In Brown, the Court’s central 
finding that separate educational facilities are inherently unequal was chiefly established 
by reference to scholarly works and not by evidence in the trial record, although 
conditions in the local schools had been introduced through witnesses at trial.  See id. at 
495 n.11. 
16 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  In Miranda, the Court’s central finding was 
that counsel was crucial to stationhouse interrogation and such interrogation was 
inherently coercive.  See id. at 466.  Manuals instructing police on how to conduct such 
interrogations mostly established these facts.  Id. 448–49. 
17 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 888–898 (1992).  In 
Casey, one of the Court’s findings was that a small percentage of cases revealed a 
likelihood that a husband who was advised that his wife was seeking an abortion would 
resort to violence.  Id. at 889.  A subset of this finding was that husbands could not be 
deterred and women would therefore not exercise their constitutional right to choose.  Id. 
at 890–91.  These findings of fact, in addition to several hundred others, were made by 
the trial court and supported the conclusions ultimately reflected in Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion in Casey. 
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18 This overview is necessarily a summary drawn from a number of sources.  The best 
references for a reader would be the briefs of the parties on summary judgment, as well 
as the pleadings themselves. 
19 Many of the details of the controversy and lawsuit were reported in the local 
newspaper, the Newport News Times.  To search the archives of the Newport News 
Times, see http://www.newportnewstimes.com/archives/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2004). 
20 The docket number for the appeal in the Oregon Court of Appeals is A 114655.  The 
appeal was withdrawn by the citizens who had appealed on January 11, 2002. 
21 See DIRECTIVES, supra note 7.  Specific policy statements published by the bishops 
and a history of the Directives are given in the preamble and notes one and six of the 
Directives.  Id. at pmbl., Notes. 
22 See generally id.  For a detailed discussion of these prohibitions as a group, see id. at 
pts. IV–V.  For discussion of each prohibition separately, see id. at pt. III, directive 36 
(abortion); pt. IV, directive 45 (abortion); pt. V, directive 60 (assisted suicide); pt. IV, 
directives 48, 53 (reproductive surgery); pt. IV, directives 40–41, 43 (artificial 
reproductive techniques); pt. IV, directive 52 (natural family planning methods). 
23 As to the terms of the agreement, see infra Part III.B. 
24 DIRECTIVES, supra note 7, at app. 
25 Id. at pt. VI. 
26 Id. at pt. VI, directive 71.  The term “scandal” in this context is a term of art, meaning 
confusion or compromise of basic tenets of the Church or faith.  Id. 
27 Id. at pt. VI. 
28 Id. at pt. VI, directive 67. 
29 Id. at pt. VI, directive 68. 
30 Id. at pt. VI, directive 69. 
31 Id. at pt. VI, directive 70. 
32 DIRECTIVES, supra note 7, at gen. intro. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at pmbl. 
35 Id. at  pt. I, directive 1. 
36 Id. at pt. I, directive 5. 
37 DIRECTIVES, supra note 7, at pt. III. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at pt. III, directive 24. 
40 For a discussion on the treatment of sexual assault victims, see id. at pt. III, directive 
36. 
41 Id. 
42 DIRECTIVES, supra note 7, at pt. IV, intro. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at pt. IV, directives 40–42. 
45 Id. at pt. IV, directive 45.  In addition to totally prohibiting abortion, Directive 45 
provides that “abortion . . . in its moral context, includes the interval between conception 
and the implantation of the embryo.” 
46 Id. at pt. IV, intro.; id. at pt. IV, directive 52. 
47 Id. at pt. IV, directive 50. 
Merger of Religious and Public Hospitals 293 
VOLUME 3 • ISSUE 1 • 2004 
 
48 DIRECTIVES, supra note 7, at pt. V. 
49 Id. at intro. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at pt. V, directive 57. 
52 Id. at pt. V, directive 59. 
53 Id. at pt. V, directive 60. 
54 Id. 
55 DIRECTIVES, supra note 7, at pt. VI, directive 70. 
56 Operating Agreement between Providence Health System, Oregon, and Pacific 
Communities Health District 65 (June 2000) (on file with the Seattle Journal for Social 
Justice) [hereinafter OA]. 
57 Id. at 1. 
58 OA, supra note 56, at 1. 
59 Id. 
60 PROVIDENCE HEALTH SYSTEM, CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 2 (2004) 
http://www.providence.org/resources/phs/2003PHSCombined.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 
2004); Providence Health System, A Focus on Excellence Inspired by Mission: The 
Good Work 2004 Fact Sheet 3 (2004),  
http://www.providence.org/resources/phs/tgw2003/2004FactSheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 
16, 2004) (as of 2004, Providence has nearly 33,000 employees). 
61 OA, supra note 56, at 1. 
62 Providence Health System, Hospitals in the Providence Health System, available at 
http://www.providence.org/PHS/Locations/default.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2004). 
63 Restated Articles of Incorporation of the Sisters of Providence in Oregon (May 8, 
1991) (on file with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice) [hereinafter Restated Articles]. 
64 See OA, supra note 56, at 65. 
65 Id. at 1. 
66 Id. 
67 See, e.g., Letter from Corrinne C. Williams, Counsel for the Ad Hoc Committee, to 
Gary Hoagland, Chair of Board of Pacific Communities Health District (Feb. 17, 2000) 
(on file with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice) (providing a mark-up of the 
“Affiliation Agreement”). 
68 Id. 
69 See OA, supra note 56. 
70 See Letter from Corrinne C. Williams, supra note 67. 
71 See OA, supra note 56. 
72 Id. at 1–2. 
73 Id. at 3. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 4. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 4–5. 
78 Id. at 6. 
79 Id. at 7. 
80 Id. 
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81 Id. at 9. 
82 Id. at 9–10. 
83 Id. at 10. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 11. 
86 Id. at 11–12. 
87 Id. at 13. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 14. 
91 Id. at 15. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 16. 
94 Id. at 16–18. 
95 Id. at 19. 
96 Id. at 29. 
97 Id. at 31 (emphasis added). 
98 Id. at 23. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 24. 
101 Id. at 40. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 42. 
104 Id. at 42–43. 
105 Id. at 44. 
106 Id. at 45. 
107 Id. at 28. 
108 Id. at C-1, C-2. 
109 Id. 54–56. 
110 Id. at 55. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Letter from Arthur LaFrance, Counsel for the Ad Hoc Committee, to Gary Hoagland, 
Chair of Board of Pacific Communities Health District (Dec. 23, 1999) (on file with the 
author). 
114 Id. 
115 Letter from Corrine C. Williams, supra note 67. 
116 OR. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2–3, 5.  By agreement of counsel, the state law issues were 
briefed by counsel for the ACLU in its appearance on the summary judgment motion—its 
only appearance in the litigation.  That briefing was incorporated by reference in the Ad 
Hoc Committee’s filings.  Despite repeated requests, neither the ACLU nor any other 
public interest group, including Planned Parenthood, NOW, or NARAL, entered the case 
in support of the Ad Hoc Committee.  Obviously, their stature and expertise would have 
been major resources. 
117 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004). 
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118 Obviously, the subjects of § 1983 actions and federal jurisdiction are peripheral to the 
Newport case, which went forward in state court.  Therefore, there is no need to discuss 
or to cite to relevant case law for the proposition that, as a First Amendment case, the 
Newport litigation might properly have been brought in federal court.  The Supreme 
Court decisions discussed infra in Part V.B are ample support for that proposition. 
119 For over a decade, the author of this article directed the legal services for a national 
litigation conference series on federal litigation offered by the Legal Services 
Corporation and has also written on the subject of public interest litigation.  See generally 
Arthur B. LaFrance, Federal Litigation for the Poor, LAW & SOC. ORDER, 1972, at 1; 
Arthur B. LaFrance, Federal Rule 11 and Public Interest Litigation, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. 
331 (1988); Arthur B. LaFrance, Tobacco Litigation: Smoke, Mirrors and Public Policy, 
26 AM. J.L. & MED. 187 (2000).  He most recently served as counsel for the American 
Cancer Society in the multistate tobacco litigation and served as amicus for the 
Northwest Consortium of Law Schools in the conversion proceeding involving Premera 
Blue Cross. 
120 The judge in Eugene, Oregon, who would have heard cases from Newport, Oregon, 
had earlier written an extremely conservative opinion invalidating Oregon’s assisted 
suicide law.  OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805 (2003).  See Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491, 
1503 (D. Or. 1994), vacated by 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997).  In contrast, one of the 
judges in Portland, Oregon, invalidated a directive by John Ashcroft that criminalized 
assisted suicide.  Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1093 (D. Or. 2002), aff’d, 
368 F.3d 1118, 1131 (9th Cir. 2004). 
121 The point of this article is not to critique the state trial judge who ultimately heard the 
case, but it is fair to point out the limitations that he imposed upon counsel.  At the 
beginning, despite counsel’s response that the Ad Hoc Committee needed a week to 
present its case, a single week was allowed for the presentation of both sides.  At the end 
of the litigation, Providence and the Health District arranged to confer ex parte with the 
judge to dismiss the case. 
122 Petition for Judicial Examination and Judgment, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227  
(Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice) 
[hereinafter Petition].  It recited preliminarily: 
In recent years there have been rapid changes in the nature of the delivery of 
health care services and in the insurance and government programs that fund 
such services, which has [sic] caused great instability and unpredictability in 
the financial environment for the provision of health care.  Some small health 
care providers have been forced to close, and the [Health] District has seen its 
financial position erode.  In response to these changes, the Board determined 
that an affiliation with a large health care system would help reduce costs, 
provide support against sudden fluctuations in costs, and generally provide a 
more stable environment in which to ensure that quality health care services 
continue to be available to residents of the [Health] District. 
*   *   * 
Following its evaluation of the proposals, the Board determined unanimously 
that the proposal submitted by Providence would best meet the needs of the 
District and its residents and best satisfy the goals articulated in The Principles 
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of Affiliation.  Accordingly, the Board entered into negotiations for an 
operating agreement with Providence. 
*   *   * 
The full legal name of Providence is “Providence Health System-Oregon,” 
which is an Oregon nonprofit corporation that is exempt from taxation under 
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.  The sole member of 
Providence is “Sisters of Providence-Mother Joseph Province,” which is the 
Northwest geographic region of the Sisters of Providence, a Catholic religious 
community with its headquarters in Montreal, Canada.  Providence has a long 
history of providing high quality health and managed care services in 
communities throughout Oregon. 
*   *   * 
The negotiations between the [Health] District and Providence continued for 
several months, and eventually matured into the Agreement.  Under the 
Agreement, the [Health] District has agreed to lease and transfer operation, but 
not ownership, of certain of its real and personal property to Providence, in 
exchange for which Providence has agreed to operate the property in a 
mutually agreed upon manner and in accordance with all applicable state and 
federal laws in order to ensure that quality health care services continue to be 
available to residents of the [Health] District.  A copy of the Agreement is 
attached as Exhibit C, and is incorporated by this reference. 
Id. at 3–4, ¶¶ 9, 12–14. 
123 See OR. REV. STAT § 33.710 (2003); OR. REV. STAT § 33.720 (2003).  This action is a 
statutory vehicle closely akin to a declaratory judgment proceeding. 
124 Petition, supra note 122, at 6. 
125 Id. at 7, ¶ 4.  Hence, the proceeding was styled a validation proceeding; a kind of 
declaratory judgment was sought.  However, the Health District and Providence named 
no defendants, so the proceeding also had the qualities of an in rem or condemnation 
proceeding.  Although a validation proceeding is a familiar device in municipal law, it 
has few counterparts anywhere else in civil or criminal law. 
126 Id. at 1, ¶ 1. 
127 Id. at 1. 
128 See id. 
129 Id. at Ex. A. 
130 Id. 
131 See id. at Ex. B. 
132 See id. at Ex. C. 
133 OA, supra note 56, at C-2. 
134 Id.  Obviously, the “healing ministry of Jesus” is a religious concept, but without 
more, it is unexceptionable.  The “core values” were not offensive to the Constitution or 
to the Ad Hoc Committee; rather, it was what these values translated into—the 
Directives—that the Committee found objectionable.  However, the Directives were not 
mentioned in the agreement or the accompanying exhibits. 
135 See, e.g., Bd. of Klamath County Comm’rs v. Select County Employees, 939 P.2d 80 
(Or. Ct. App. 1997); Drummond v. Oregon Dep’t of Transp., 730 P.2d 582 (Or. Ct. App. 
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1986); Rogers v. Lane County, 771 P.2d 254 (Or. 1989); Eustace v. Speckhart, 514 P.2d 
65 (Or. Ct. App. 1973). 
136 See Mullane v Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Eisen v 
Carlisle & Jaquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 174–75 (1974); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 
462 U.S. 791, 795 (1983); OR. R. CIV. P. 7(D)(6)(a–d). 
137 Motion to Intervene, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 
2000) (on file with author). 
138 OR. R. CIV. P. 29(A)(1); Hudson v. Feder, 836 P.2d 779 (Or. Ct. App. 1992).  An 
argument might also have been made that the local Diocese was an indispensable party.  
It is not clear that Providence was required to intervene, since it was, strictly speaking, a 
part of the world against which the Health District was proceeding in rem.  The Ad Hoc 
Committee declined to intervene and appeared instead as a defendant, more accurately 
reflecting its position and avoiding some of the burdens and hazards confronting 
interveners. 
139 Motion to Dismiss, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 
2000) (on file with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice) [hereinafter Motion to 
Dismiss]. 
140 Defandants’ Memorandum on Motion to Dismiss at 1–2, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 
00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the Seattle Journal for Social 
Justice) [hereinafter Defendant’s Memorandum on Motion to Dismiss].  The arguments 
and case law underlying the motion to dismiss were developed more elaborately on the 
motions for summary judgment and are discussed there.  See infra Part IV.D. 
141 Id.  A separate motion to dismiss was filed pro se by an individual intervener, a 
Newport attorney who had initially been affiliated with the Ad Hoc Committee.  The 
motion to dismiss argued that there was a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, personal 
jurisdiction, and sufficiency of summons; moreover, the petition failed to state ultimate 
facts sufficient to state a claim on which relief might be granted.  The motion to dismiss 
challenged bringing the action as in rem.  It also maintained that the petition was 
proceeding under a statute that unlawfully delegated power from the executive or 
legislative branch to the judicial branch.  The motion to dismiss maintained that the 
Health District lacked authority to bring the proceeding and that notice had been 
insufficient to comport with due process.  It was denied and ultimately, after filing other 
papers and interlocutory appeals, the attorney retained counsel a few weeks before trial. 
142 Counterclaims for Damages Injunctive Relief and Attorneys Fees, In re Gary 
Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the Seattle Journal 
for Social Justice) [hereinafter Counterclaims]. 
143 Id. at 4, ¶ 8. 
144 Id. at 5–6, ¶¶ 11–12. 
145 Id. at 6–7, ¶¶ 15–16. 
146 Id. at 7, ¶¶ 17–21. 
147 Id. at 9, ¶¶ 22–27. 
148 Id. at 11, ¶¶ 28–32.  This claim for relief was subsequently withdrawn. 
149 Id. at 15, ¶ 37(f).  The Oregon validation statute denied a jury trial, possibly because in 
rem proceedings partake of injunction proceedings in equity.  See OR. REV. STAT § 
33.710, supra note 123.  However, the Ad Hoc Committee’s counterclaims were clearly 
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the stuff of jury trials.  To economize on resources, the claim to the jury was withdrawn.  
Contra Counterclaims, supra note 142, at 15, ¶ 37(f). 
150 See Counterclaims, supra note 142. 
151 The modifier “direct” is unclear.  Several people connected with Providence or the 
Health District used the term, implying that some abortions are not “direct” and would be 
permitted.  Perhaps the term “direct” refers to abortions that are for the purpose of ending 
a pregnancy, instead of another purpose, such as saving the life of the mother. 
152 Significantly, this was one of the concessions between Providence and the [Health] 
District regarding changes in practice or policy after the merger.  Such a change could 
only be attributed to religious principles, found in the Directives.  However, later 
Providence and the Health District argued that there were no abortions being performed, 
and so the “change” was really no change at all.  Regardless, the Ad Hoc Committee’s 
position was that a change in policy was itself sufficient to trigger constitutional 
prohibitions. 
153 The reproductive rights claims were closely aligned with the claims concerning 
religion, but they were not identical.  Even if family planning, abortion, or other 
reproductive issues were unaffected by the merger, there would still have been issues 
raised by a religious organization that received aid from the government and controlled it. 
154 For example, a leading heart surgeon, Albert Starr, so testified at trial.  Trial 
Transcript, Testimony of Dr. Albert Starr, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. 
filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Testimony of Starr].  Similarly, 
Health District physicians testified that they anticipated no impact on the way they would 
practice medicine.  Trial Transcript, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. filed 
Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Trial Transcript]. 
155 See discussion infra Part V.B. 
156 Again, see discussion infra Part V.B. for relevant Supreme Court decisions under the 
Lemon v Kurtzman entanglement standard.  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 
(1971). 
157 As the depositions and trial testimony unfolded, it appeared that the [Health] District 
had sought proposals only from religiously affiliated hospital systems, although a for-
profit hospital was operated in McMinnville, a community only fifty miles away.  This 
was intentional religious discrimination.  See discussion infra Part V.B. 
158 Ultimately, Providence’s ethicist, Father Tuohey, testified that enforcement varied 
from place to place, while the Diocese’s chancellor (subpoenaed without having been 
interviewed by the intervener) testified that the bishop would not interfere.  The 
Committee’s witness, Father Golinski, testified that the bishop’s nihil obstat was 
indispensable, as the Directives themselves essentially provide.  See supra Part II.A.; 
infra Part V.A. 
159 Matters of constitutional fact have been important in such landmark cases as Brown v. 
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  See Introduction, supra Part I.A. 
160 Intervenor Providence Health System-Oregon’s Motion for Summary Judgment, In re 
Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the Seattle 
Journal for Social Justice) [hereinafter Intervenor Motion for Summary Judgment]. 
161 Id. at 2. 
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162 Affidavit of Mark May in Support of Intervenor Providence Health System-Oregon’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, ¶ 2, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. 
filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice) [hereinafter Aff. 
of Mark May]. 
163 Id. at 1, ¶ 3. 
164 Id. at 2, ¶ 4. 
165 Id. at 2, ¶¶ 6–7. 
166 Id. at 2, ¶¶ 7–8. 
167 Id. at 2, ¶ 8. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 3, ¶ 9.  This last point was important, but hardly one that the Directives would 
support, except in the most formal sense, or that an aggressive bishop would necessarily 
concede. 
170 Id. at 3, ¶ 10. 
171 Id. at 4, ¶ 13.  Of course, all of this was true, in a general way.  However, important 
concerns were not addressed: exactly how did the Directives impact services, and what 
was meant by May’s statement that the services would not be “religious”?  The services 
were health care, and not to proselytize, evangelize, conduct religious instruction, or 
worship (except perhaps in chapels), but if the services were limited or directed by 
religious principles in ways nonsectarian hospitals were not, in that sense they were 
“religious.” 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 4, ¶ 14. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 4–5, ¶ 15. 
176 Restated Articles, supra note 63, at 1. 
177 Supplemental Affidavit of Mark May at 1, ¶ 2, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 
(Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice); 
Resolutions of Board of Directors of the Pacific Communities Health District, Resolution 
No. 00-02 (March 2, 2000) (on file with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice) 
[hereinafter Resolution No. 00-02]. 
178 Resolution No. 00-02, supra note 177, at 1.  Each one of these hospital systems is 
church affiliated.  It appears that the Health District deliberately chose not to seek bids 
from other nonprofits or for-profit providers. 
179 Id. at 2. 
180 Defendants’ Cross-Motion on Summary Judgment, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 
(Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice) 
[hereinafter Defendants’ Cross-Motion]. 
181 Id. at 1–2, ¶ 1. 
182 Id. at 2, ¶ 2. 
183 Id. at 2, ¶ 3. 
184 Id. at 2–3, ¶ 5(b)–(c). 
185 Id. at 1. 
186 Id. at 3–4, ¶ 6. 
187 Id. 
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188 Id. at 2–3, ¶ 5(a)–(c). 
189 Id. at 2, ¶ 2. 
190 Id. at 1–2, ¶¶ 1–4. 
191 OR. R. CIV. P. 47(C) (2003). 
192 OR. REV. STAT. § 435.475 (3) (2003). 
193 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615 (“In order to determine whether the government entanglement 
with religion is excessive, we must examine the character and purposes of the institutions 
that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting 
relationship between the government and the religious authority.”). 
194 Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment of Intervenor Providence Health 
System-Oregon at 18–20, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 
2000) (on file with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice) [hereinafter Brief in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment]. 
195 Id. 
196 Defendants’ Memorandum on Summary Judgment, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 
(Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice) 
[hereinafter Defendants’ Memorandum on Summary Judgment]. 
197 See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) 
(invalidating a state statute drawing a special school district boundary around a religious 
community). 
198 Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (invalidating a state statute that 
allowed religious institutions to effectively veto a business’s application for a liquor 
license). 
199 Defendants’ Memorandum on Summary Judgment, supra note 196, at 17 (citing Santa 
Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (ruling on whether a school district’s 
practice of allowing student-led prayer before football games violated the Establishment 
Clause); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding that clerical members offering 
prayers as part of the official school graduation ceremony was inconsistent with the 
Establishment Clause)).  See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that a 
city had not impermissibly advanced religion by including a crèche in a Christmas 
display); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding that the display of 
a crèche outside a county courthouse without other secular decorations violated the 
Establishment Clause). 
200 See Moore v. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n., No. 1030398, 2004 WL 922668, at 2–3 (Ala. 
Apr. 30, 2004). 
201 See Defendants’ Memorandum on Summary Judgment, supra note 196, at 24–31. 
202 See id. at 24. 
203 See id. at 25. 
204 See OA, supra note 56, at 28. 
205 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.  At this point in their argument, the defendant particularly 
looked to Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 
(1975), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); and Agostini v. Felton, 521 
U.S. 203 (1997).  Defendants’ Memorandum on Summary Judgment, supra note 196, at 
26.  Agostini recast the Lemon three-part test in the entanglement inquiry as a singular 
determination of a statute’s effect and created three primary criteria for determining a 
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statute’s effect: state assistance advances religion if it (1) results in governmental 
indoctrination, (2) defines its recipients by reference to religion, or (3) creates an 
excessive entanglement.  Id. at 232–233. 
206 Defendants’ Memorandum on Summary Judgment, supra note 196, at 31–38 (relying 
on Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Bowen v. 
Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); and Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989)). 
207 Defendants’ Memorandum on Summary Judgment, supra note 196, at 36. 
208 Id. at 35 (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977)). 
209 Defendants’ Memorandum on Summary Judgment, supra note 196, at 36 (citing 
Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990)). 
210 Defendants’ Memorandum on Summary Judgment, supra note 196, at 36. 
211 Id. at 38–54. 
212 Id. at 38. 
213 Id. at 42 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). 
214 Defendants’ Memorandum on Summary Judgment, supra note 196, at 42 (citing 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)). 
215 Defendants’ Memorandum on Summary Judgment, supra note 196, at 42–47 (citing 
and discussing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)). 
216 Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment of Intervenor Providence 
Health System-Oregon, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 
2000) (on file with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice) [hereinafter Reply Brief]. 
217 Id. at 1. 
218 Id. at 2. 





224 Id. at 13. 
225 Id.  The point at this juncture of the article is simply to report the positions of the 
parties, not to litigate them.  However it may be appropriate to note that the affidavit had 
not been subject to cross-examination; at trial, under cross-examination, Mr. Fraser 
agreed that the hospital was solvent and had been consistently in the black over the 
preceding years.  See infra Part V.A.1. 
226 Reply Brief, supra note 216, at 14. 
227 Id. at 16–17. 
228 Id. at 16. 
229 Id.  Whatever merit that distinction has in the education cases involved in Lemon, it 
has little relevance to instances where, as in the Newport case, the Health District was not 
only transferring monies to a church-affiliated entity but also governance of itself, 
adopting the religious principles and symbols of the religious entity in the process. 
230 Id. at 20.  However, ownership still remained in the Health District, as did its identity 
and participation in funding and governance within the new Providence structure. 
231 Id. at 20–21. 
232 Id. at 20. 
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233 Id. at 28–36. 
234 Ruling on Rule 47 Motions for Summary Judgment, Memorandum Opinion and 
Order, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with 
the Seattle Journal for Social Justice) [hereinafter Ruling on Motions for Summary 
Judgment]. 
235 Id. at 1–15.  This part of the ruling is notable for criticizing defense counsel for filing a 
summary judgment motion dependent upon lengthy depositions and then preparing and 
presenting at oral argument a fourteen-page outline analysis of the issues and that 
evidence. 
236 Id. at 16. 
237 See id. at 18.  Of course, this would mean a constitutional challenge could never 
succeed where the religious entity’s religious “function” was to do nothing, as with 
withholding end of life or reproductive services for religious reasons. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. at 18–19.  Of course, that question is also raised under the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 
240 Id. at 21. 
241 Id. 
242 Id. at 22. 
243 Id. 
244 Id. at 23. 
245 Id. at 24. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. at 26. 
248 Id. 
249 Id. 
250 Cf. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 892–93.  That an entity is pervasively religious is a legal 
conclusion rather than an element of the burden of proof the Ad Hoc Committee had to 
bear. 
251 See generally OA, supra note 56. 
252 Cf. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (holding that a lessee of 
space in a public parking garage was engaged in “state action” sufficiently to offend the 
Fourteenth Amendment by denying service to African Americans). 
253 Trial Transcript, supra note 154. 
254 Id. 
255 Id. 
256 Trial Transcript, Testimony of John Lee, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. 
Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Testimony of Lee]. 
257 Id. 
258 Id.  This would be a linchpin of the citizens’ argument concerning state action, as well 
as entanglement for First Amendment purposes. 
259 Trial Transcript, Testimony of Dr. Cely, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. 
Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Testimony of Cely]. 
260 Id. 
261 Id. 
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262 See id. 
263 Trial Transcript, Testimony of Dr. Long, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. 
Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Testimony of Long]. 
264 Id. 
265 Trial Transcript, Testimony of Mary Jo Tully, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. 





270 See Trial Transcript, Testimony of Michael Fraser, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 
(Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Testimony of 
Fraser]. 
271 Id. 
272 This, of course, is religious discrimination—an independent basis for challenging the 
Agreement quite apart from the many arguments about entanglement and service and 
funding of religion.  See infra Part V.B. 
273 That affiliation is now complete, and as a result the Health District signs reflect the 
name of the hospital as Samaritan Pacific Communities Hospital. 






280 See Testimony of Tuohey, supra note 13. 
281 Editor’s Note: This summary was taken from Defendants’ Closing Brief rather than 
from the actual trial testimony in part because the Seattle Journal for Social Justice does 
not have the entire trial testimony on file. 
282 Chiefly RU-486, an abortifacient, widely used in Europe but under consideration for 
use in the United States by the FDA at the time of this litigation.  The Catholic Church 
would similarly oppose use of hormonal cocktails to prevent implantation of a fertilized 
egg. 
283 See generally TOM. L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES. F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF 
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (5th ed. 1979).  This is a comprehensive review of the content and 
history of ethical and moral philosophy, and it develops basic concepts such as 
autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice.  In no sense is it a prescriptive set 
of mandates like the Ethical and Religious Directives. 
284 The agreement was not, in fact, a “complete takeover.”  Even if it were, the last four 
Directives express a concern for “scandal”—that is, moral compromise and confusion—
which would apply to either partnerships or “complete takeovers.”  Significantly, 
Providence and the trial judge had, for other purposes, found that there was not a 
complete takeover, thereby avoiding attributing state action to Providence’s running of 
the hospital. 
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285 Defendants’ Closing Brief at 11–12, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. 
filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Closing Brief]. 
286 See Testimony of Tuohey, supra note 13. 
287 Trial Transcript, Testimony of Virginia Terhaar, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 
(Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Testimony of 
Terhaar]. 
288 Trial Transcript, supra note 154. 
289 Id. 
290 See id. 
291 Trial Transcript, Testimony of Lois Backus, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. 
Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Testimony of Backus]. 
292 OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (2003). 
293 Trial Transcript, Testimony of George Eighmey, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 
(Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Testimony of 
Eighmey]. 
294 Id. 
295 See id. 
296 Trial Transcript, Testimony of Father John Golenski, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-
1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Testimony of 
Golenski]. 
297 See supra note 281. 
298 The significance of Medicare funding is deceptive.  Providence technically receives 
Medicare payments only because Medicare patients choose to use its hospitals or 
managed care plans.  For HHS to prevent this would be religious discrimination; to allow 
it, of course, is not establishing religion, because it is the patient’s choice.  In contrast, the 
Health District was transferring money, facilities, and its very governance directly to 
Providence, a far more direct and comprehensive transfer. 
299 Closing Brief, supra note 285, at 8–9. 
300 Trial Transcript, Testimony of Merwyn Greenlick, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 




303 Again, this raises the considerations that made federal court an attractive venue in this 
case, although the travel and attendance burdens on the clients would then have been 
greater. 
304 In Newport, each of the corporate petitioners was represented by a large, experienced 
trial firm that had one senior partner, one junior associate, and one paralegal in the 
courtroom throughout the trial.  The wall was lined with lawyer boxes.  The flow of 
exhibits was nonstop and elegant.  This is not the biggest display that the author has 
faced; in the tobacco litigation, there were eighteen attorneys in the courtroom during one 
day.  See articles cited supra note 119. 
305 Brief of Amicie Curiae, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 
2000), http://www.aclu-or.org/litigation/newport.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2004). 
306 Trial Transcript, supra note 154. 
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307 See Joel Gallo, Providence Backs Out of Affiliation Agreement with Pacific 
Communities, NEWPORT NEWS-TIMES, Jan. 19, 2001, available at  
http://www.newportnewstimes.com/articles/2001/01/19/general/news-03.txt (posted on 
Feb 26, 2004). 
308 A copy of the original may be obtained on the Seattle Journal for Social Justice Web 
site at http://www.seattleu.edu/sjsj. 
309 Closing Brief, supra note 285, at 17–29.  The brief notes the following: 
[T]he [Health] District proposes a partnership with Providence under an 
Operating Agreement which will terminate employment of any employee 
refusing to accept the Roman Catholic Religious Directives imposed by 
Providence.  This is clear discrimination against people on religious grounds.  
Discrimination favoring Roman Catholic beliefs is equally clear: governance is 
shared with Providence, subject to the Directives; religious endorsement and 
symbols will be institutionalized; present and future services will be limited by 
Catholic Religious Directives; the administration of the Agreement will require 
ongoing entanglement of the District and Providence, not only to sort out the 
impact of the Religious Directives on needed medical services, but also to 
work out huge ambiguities in performance requirements. . . . This is a 
governmental involvement—state action—with a pervasively religious entity. 
 
Defendants do not claim that Providence is “pervasively religious” in the sense 
that all aspects of its operations are somehow religious.  No entity is all only 
one thing.  Catholic schools or HMO’s or hospitals or orphanages are not only 
about religion.  They provide services much like those of their nonreligious 
counterparts.  What distinguishes them are their governing religious principles, 
and the impact on consumers, employees and services.  In the realm of 
church/state analysis under the Constitution, any arrangement is invalid if it 
discriminates in favor of religion or helps a religiously-grounded entity in its 
religious mission.  Both of those are true here, even though much—perhaps 
most—of what Providence does is health care done elsewhere. 
Id. at 17–18. 
310 Id. at 30–45.  The brief further notes the following: 
The symbolic endorsement of religion in this case is remarkable in at least two 
respects.  Unlike any other Providence hospital, the sign in Newport will have 
not just the Providence name and location (e.g., Providence/Milwaukee) but 
the name of a governmental agency as well.  The name will be “Providence 
Pacific Communities Hospital” . . . . When asked, Norman Johnson, an 
experienced health care administrator and former District Board member, 
easily identified the logo as conveying a joint partnership of government and 
religion.  Indeed, that is the arrangement created by the Operating Agreement.  
This linkage of government and religion will be conveyed also by the new 
letterhead and all promotional materials—Providence Pacific Communities 
Hospital. 
*   *   * 
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The decisions of the United States Supreme Court are uniform; government 
may not adopt religious symbols or employ or display them.  Such symbols 
may range from endorsing doctrine to adopting logos, as in this case, to 
espousing religious teaching, such as [t]he Ten Commandments, or sponsoring 
prayer, such as The Lord’s Prayer.  Each of these, in some degree, involves the 
practice of religion.  But all have in common the centrally offensive element of 
endorsing religion.  Thus, most recently, in Sante Fe Independent School v. 
Doe, 120 S. Ct. 226 (2000), the Supreme Court invalidated a practice of 
student led, student-initiated invocations prior to football games at a Texas 
high school.  The opinion by Justice Stevens found the practice 
indistinguishable from that invalidated in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 
(1992), where a prayer had been delivered by a Rabbi at a middle school 
graduation.  To some extent, both prayer exercises were invalidated because 
they were coercive of the people in attendance.  But the fact that only one 
prayer was permitted at a time was equally troublesome, since it singled out 
that point of view for favorable endorsement. 
Id. at 36–38. 
311 Id. at 46–66.  The brief continues: 
First, substantial governmental authority and functions have either been 
delegated to, or shared with, Providence by the [Health] District Board.  
Second, services and policy are restricted on terms dictated by the religious 
principles of Providence, and The Healing Ministry of Jesus.  Thirdly, an 
irresponsibly favorable transfer of assets and aid to a religious body, The 
Sisters of Providence, is being made, on terms and under circumstances 
assuring unconstitutional entanglement between government and religion. . . . 
The most important transfer, in this case, is not in the financial, physical or 
service levels.  It is on the governmental level.  The [Health] District is a 
governmental unit, charged by Oregon law with health care responsibilities to 
[Health] District residents. . . . Those responsibilities have now been largely 
delegated to, or shared with, a religiously-affiliated hospital chain.  Whether 
present services or personnel will be adversely affected is simply irrelevant.  
The delegation itself is government action, emphatically subject to religious 
controls and criteria.  The subordination of public authority to religious 
decisionmaking [sic] suffices to offend the Oregon and [U]nited States 
Constitutions, as tending to establish religion. 
Id. at 46, 48. 
312 Id. at 67–83.  The brief notes the following: 
The pervasively religious nature of Providence and the resulting impact on 
health care were amply developed by witness George Aighmey [sic].  
[E]ighmey is an estates attorney, a former Oregon legislator who was 
intimately involved in the passage of Oregon’s Death With Dignity Act, and is 
presently Executive Director of Compassion in Dying.  In that capacity he has 
directly counseled or worked with many dying patients, some in Lincoln 
County.  Their capacity to obtain assistance will be seriously compromised 
under the Operating Agreement, because of the Religious Directives, as 
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confirmed by [E]ighmey’s direct experience in dealing with Providence.  That 
experience includes taking testimony as a legislator on the Judiciary 
Committee, in which Providence opposed physician-assisted suicide; 
administering an AIDS hospice owned by Providence, which limited contacts 
between homosexuals; and meeting and discussing these issues with John Lee 
and Father Tuohey, where they expressed the views reflected in the Religious 
Directives.  There will be an impact on services in Lincoln County. 
 
Lois Backus, the Executive Director of Planned Parenthood, testified to the 
same effect.  As such she is responsible for developing and delivering 
educational and clinical programs and services involving abortion, 
sterilization, contraception and family planning.  All of these would be 
prohibited under the Operating Agreement, because of the Religious 
Directives.  The impact of this was dramatized by the simple testimony that the 
most widely used method of contraception is tubal ligation, performed upon 
many women after labor and delivery.  All agree this is now available at the 
Newport Hospital.  It would not be available under the partnership with 
Providence’s management. 
Id. at 64. 
313 Id. at 67.  The brief notes the following: 
The Agreement with Providence will affect present or potential health care 
services at the beginning of life, such as assisted reproduction, tubal ligations, 
vasectomies, and abortion.  End of life health care will also be burdened or 
precluded, particularly…advance Directives and physician assisted suicide 
under Oregon’s Death With Dignity Act. . . . A similar fate awaits family 
planning and contraception. All of this has been amply argued previously. . . . 
Here, however, a different emphasis and context are presented.  The [Health] 
District by its Agreement with Providence is sharply curtailing its role as 
health care provider.  It has deliberately chosen a provider who will 
inadequately assume the [Health] District’s responsibilities.  [Health] District 
residents will have to travel great distances or go without beginning of life and 
end of life services.  The [Health] District, through Providence, is burdening 
residents’ interests in those services, interests which are constitutionally 
protected . . . . 
 
The three sources of entitlement here—substantive statutes, organic statutes 
setting up the [Health] District, and the [Health] District’s own Bylaws—
create legitimate expectations in the citizens in the [Health] District.  These 
interests are protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The Due Process Clause 
protects citizens of the [Health] District from the loss of liberty without Due 
Process of law.  Liberty may be procedural, protected by the right to a hearing, 
or it may be “substantive”, that is, a form of “liberty” created by statutory 
expectancy or entitlement under state law, as noted above.  There is a third 
form of “liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and that consists of 
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liberties created by the United States Constitution itself.  These liberties are 
endangered, unduly burdened, when government as here—arbitrarily abandons 
its role and curtails service, entrusting its services to a hostile provider. 
 
*** 
The merit of—and need for—the partnership Agreement with Providence bears 
directly on its constitutionality.  There are two grounds of Constitutional 
invalidity: that the First Amendment[’s] and Article I’s bars on aid to religion 
are violated, and that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process protection of 
liberty, including choice and autonomy in health care, is infringed.  These 
infringements can only be justified by governmental interests that are so 
“compelling” that the infringements are not “undue burdens.”  But the 
Operating Agreement does not serve even minimally rational interests, let 
alone compelling interests. 
*** 
John Lee and Michael Fraser testified (as did Mark May) that the [Health] 
District does not need to be “saved.”  The [Health] District has consistently 
operated “in the black” and—indeed—has built $8,000,000 in reserves over 
the past two decades from operating income.  At most, there is a danger of 
financial risk faced over the next few years by small, rural hospitals.  But 
Father John Golenski testified that the 1994 Balanced Budget Act, which cut 
back on hospital revenues, causing those economic difficulties, is under review 
and revision.  His present position requires reviewing such developments for a 
consortium of health care and community agencies. 
Id. at 67–68, 73–74. 
314 See Gallo, supra note 307. 
315 See Counterclaims for Damages and Injunctive Relief at 8, 12, In re Gary Hoagland, 
No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) (on file with the Seattle Journal for Social 
Justice) [hereinafter Counterclaims for Damages]. 
316 Intervenor Providence Health System-Oregon’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject 
Matter Jurisdiction, In re Gary Hoagland, No. 00-1227 (Cir. Ct. Or. filed Mar. 16, 2000) 
(on file with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice). 
317 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes 
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that 
in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in 
such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the 
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the 
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of 
Columbia. 
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Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1988). 
In any action or proceeding to enforce [provisions in the vindication of civil 
rights] . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other 
than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, except 
that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken 
in such officer’s judicial capacity such officer shall not be held liable for any 
costs, including attorney’s fees, unless such action was clearly in excess of 
such officer’s jurisdiction. 
Id. 
318 See id. 
319 See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760–761 (1987); Kilgour v. City of 
Pasadena, 53 F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that even in the absence of a 
favorable judgment, a litigant may be a “prevailing party” for purposes of an attorney fee 
award if his or her action was a “catalyst” which motivated the opponents to change their 
unlawful conduct); Citizens Against Tax Waste v. Westerville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 985 
F.2d 255 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding citizens who brought suit which caused the Board to 
change its policy were a prevailing party entitled to attorney’s fees despite no final 
judgment or decree in the citizens’ favor). 
320 Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 752 (1995). 
321 Counterclaims for Damages, supra note 315, at 16. 
322 Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 
U.S. 598 (2001). 
323 Id. at 605. 
324 Having served as the attorney for the citizen litigators, the author would be remiss if 
he did not acknowledge the courage and commitment of his witnesses and clients.  A 
number of witnesses have been noted above.  Several had no stake in the case and came 
forward at some personal risk, as was the case with Virginia Terhaar and Lois Backus.  
Others, such as George Eighmey, Father Golinsky, and Merwyn Greenlich, with great 
professional expertise, faced substantial logistical burdens in presenting their testimony.  
From the Ad Hoc Committee itself, Hilda Moravick and Claudia Williams brought 
expertise as professionals to their roles as witnesses.  No case is better than its witnesses, 
and we were blessed with excellent, public-spirited witnesses in Newport. 
 The clients are deserving of equal or higher praise.  Many have been mentioned above 
and their invaluable contributions duly noted.  Particularly deserving mention are 
Corrinne Williams, Norman Johnson, and Barbara Davidson, who served in leadership 
roles, bearing much of the exposure generated by major controversy in a small 
community.  Carol Gundlach, herself a health care professional and consultant, made the 
initial contact with the author, and provided valuable expertise and a sustaining 
commitment, despite the demands of a practice and the pursuit of a graduate degree at 
Oregon State University.  Hospitality and housing for an itinerant barrister were provided 
generously by committee members Pat Wold and Nel Ward—the latter in particular 
offered the top floor of a bed-and-breakfast as a war room during the trial itself. 
 Civil liberties and community governance in a democracy are won and sustained only 
by committed people, willing to take risks in the face of hazard.  When Benjamin 
Franklin, upon leaving the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, was asked whether 
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we had a monarchy or a republic, he reportedly replied, “We have a republic, madam.  If 
we can keep it.”  I am greatly indebted to the members of the Ad Hoc Committee (as are 
the people of Newport) for their investment in our republic and their commitment to our 
Constitution. 
325 See DIRECTIVES, supra note 7, at pt. VI, directives 68–71. 
326 See Press Release, George W. Bush, Framework to Modernize and Improve Medicare 
Fact Sheet (Mar. 4, 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030304-
1.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2004). 
327 See Matthew 22:21. 
